Plant and Animal Variety : The variety exceptions of the European Patent Organisation and the European Community assessed in relation to patentable subject matter by Bryde, Martin
  
 
 
 
 
 
PLANT AND ANIMAL VARIETY 
 
The variety exceptions of the European Patent Organisation 
and the European Community assessed in relation to 
patentable subject matter  
 
 
 
Kandidatnr: 566 
Veileder: Morten Walløe Tvedt 
Leveringsfrist: 10.11 2003 
 
 
Til sammen 32750 ord 
 
 
13/01/2004
  I 
  Contents  
      
1 INTRODUCTION 1 
1.1 RESEARCH QUESTION AND THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE 1 
1.2 THE VARIETY EXCEPTIONS: A TOPIC OF CURRENT INTEREST 7 
1.3 ADJOINING ISSUES NOT DISCUSSED IN THIS THESIS 9 
1.4 BIOLOGICAL UNDERSTANDING OF PLANT AND ANIMAL VARIETY 12 
2 INTRODUCTION OF THE REGIMES 15 
2.1 THE EUROPEAN PATENT ORGANISATION 16 
2.2 THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 18 
2.3 THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION 21 
2.4 THE INTERNATIONAL UNION FOR THE PROTECTION OF NEW VARIETIES OF 
PLANTS 21 
3 METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGES 23 
3.1 PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 23 
3.2 EC LAW –A METHODICAL CHALLENGE 24 
3.3 OTHER TREATIES AS A SOURCE OF LAW 26 
4 PLANT AND ANIMAL VARIETY IN EPO AND EC 27 
4.1 WORDING 27 
4.2 SUPERORDINATE TAXONOMICAL LEVELS 33 
4.2.1 EPO CASE LAW –INTRODUCTION 33 
  II 
4.2.2 THE CIBA GEIGY CASE AND THE LUBRIZOL CASE 35 
4.2.3 THE ONCO-MOUSE CASE 38 
4.2.4 THE PLANT GENETIC SYSTEMS CASE 42 
4.2.5 OPINION G 3/95 44 
4.2.6 THE NOVARTIS I CASE 46 
4.2.7 THE NOVARTIS II CASE 49 
4.2.8 CONSEQUENCES 51 
4.2.9 OBJECT AND PURPOSE OF EPC AND THE DIRECTIVE 55 
4.2.10 EPO ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION 57 
4.2.11 THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE EC DIRECTIVE AND THE INTERACTION WITH 
EPC  58 
4.2.12 THE IMPACT OF THE COMMUNITY PLANT VARIETY RIGHTS REGULATION ON 
THE DIRECTIVE AND EPC 63 
4.2.13 EPC AS A SOURCE OF LAW WHEN INTERPRETING THE EC PATENT DIRECTIVE  
 65 
4.2.14 PATENT PRACTICE AS A SOURCE OF LAW 67 
4.2.15 CONCLUSION 68 
4.3 SUBORDINATE BIOLOGICAL LEVELS 68 
4.3.1 PLANT AND ANIMAL SPECIMENS IN RELATION TO PLANT AND ANIMAL VARIETY 69 
4.3.2 THE DEMARCATION BETWEEN CELLS AND PLANT AND ANIMAL VARIETY 72 
4.3.3 THE DELIMITATION BETWEEN PROTEINS AND VECTORS AND THE TERM VARIETY 
 79 
4.3.4 GENES IN RELATION TO PLANT AND ANIMAL VARIETY 81 
4.3.5 CONCLUSION 88 
5 UPOV-91’S IMPACT ON THE INTERPRETATION OF EPC AND THE 
DIRECTIVE 89 
  III 
5.1 INTRODUCTION –PLANT VARIETIES 89 
5.2 UPOV-91 AS A SOURCE OF LAW WHEN INTERPRETING EPC 89 
5.3 UPOV-91 AS A SOURCE OF LAW WHEN INTERPRETING THE EC PATENT 
DIRECTIVE 95 
5.4 THE DUAL PROTECTION BAN 96 
5.5 DISCUSSION OF IDENTICAL INTERPRETATION –PLANT VARIETIES 98 
5.6 CONSEQUENCES OF THE CESSATION OF THE DUAL PROTECTION BAN –PLANT 
VARIETIES 102 
5.7 CONSEQUENCES FOR THE INTERPRETATION OF ANIMAL VARIETIES 106 
6 THE TRIPS AGREEMENT’S IMPACT ON THE INTERPRETATION OF 
EPC AND THE DIRECTIVE 108 
6.1 TRIPS AS A MEANS OF INTERPRETATION FOR EPC 108 
6.2 TRIPS AS AN INTERPRETATION AID WHEN INTERPRETING THE EC PATENT 
DIRECTIVE 109 
6.3 THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 27 (3) (B) TRIPS –PLANT VARIETY 111 
6.3.1 WORDING 111 
6.3.2 INFLUENCE FROM THE UPOV-91 CONVENTION 112 
6.3.3 THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE TERM PLANT IN RELATION TO PLANT VARIETY 116 
6.3.4 THE DEMARCATION BETWEEN MICRO-ORGANISM AND PLANT VARIETY 117 
6.3.5 CONSEQUENCES FOR THE INTERPRETATION OF PLANT VARIETY IN EPC AND THE 
DIRECTIVE 118 
7 IMPLICATIONS 119 
8 LITERATURE 121 
  IV 
9 TABLE OF CASES 128 
10 TABLE OF LEGAL DOCUMENTS 129 
 
 
  1 
 
1 Introduction  
1.1 Research question and the legal landscape 
 
The point of departure in the patent law of the European Patent Organisation and the 
European Community is that all inventions are eligible for patent protection if they fulfil 
the patent requirements and not are explicitly exempted from patentability.1 In the 
European Patent Organisation and the European Community plant and animal varieties 
are excluded from patentability.2 The objective of this thesis is to discuss the legal 
understanding of the terms plant variety and animal variety in relation to patentable 
plant and animal subject matter. The distinction between patentable plant and animal 
subject matter and plant and animal varieties is important for to determine to what 
extent plants and animals can be patented. Plant and animal varieties are terms which 
are difficult to define precisely using the biological system of concepts.3 Constructing 
the legal meaning of these terms therefore becomes essential. This thesis assesses the 
delimitation of plant and animal variety relative to more general categories of plants 
and animals on a superordinate taxonomical level, such as a plant or animal family or a 
plant or animal species.4 Furthermore, the terms are delimited towards categories of 
plants and animals on subordinate levels.5 This includes an assessment of the 
                                                     
1 Article 52 (1) EPC and Article 3, first paragraph of the EC Patent Directive. 
2 Article 53 (b) EPC and Article 4, first paragraph, litra a of the EC Patent Directive. 
3 This is further discussed in Chapter 1.4. 
4 See Chapter 1.4 for a further explanation of superordinate taxonomical levels. 
5 See Chapter 1.4 for a further explanation of subordinate levels. 
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patentability of plant and animal specimens, cells, proteins, vectors and genes in relation 
to the variety exception.  This implies that the term variety can be examined from two 
angles –the superordinate and the subordinate. The approach mirrors the structure of the 
thesis.6  
 
The thesis discusses the interpretation of plant and animal varieties in the European 
Patent Convention and the EC Patent Directive where the legal understanding of the 
terms is considered. Hence, the question examined from the perspective of public 
international law and EC law. National legislation is therefore not assessed.  
 
The legal documents to be examined are The European Patent Convention (EPC); and 
Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the legal 
protection of biotechnological inventions (the Patent Directive).7 These documents are 
assessed because they apply the terms plant and animal variety. EPC states this: 
 
‘European patents shall not be granted in respect of: …plant and animal varieties….’8 
 
The EC Patent directive offers a similar provision: 
 
 ‘The following shall not be patentable: plant and animal varieties.’9 
 
                                                     
6 See respectively Chapters 4.2 and 4.3. 
7 For details on these documents and the organisations from where they derive see Chapter 2. 
8 Article 53 (b) EPC.  
9 Article 4, first paragraph of the Directive.  
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The understanding of plant and animal variety in EPC and the Directive are discussed in 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6.  
 
A patent is an exclusive legal right where the patent holder is granted the right to 
prohibit others from using the invention for commercial purposes within a limited 
period of time.10 A patent system provides an incentive for investment in inventive 
activities and enhances technology transfer.11 Considerable costs may be attached to 
such a contribution. Persons and companies who take on these costs must have a 
prospect of profit. Due to the monopoly rewarded the inventor, or his successor, a patent 
may give such outlook for future earnings.12 The patent holder is given a time limited 
exclusive right, while society may prosper from development. After the expiration of 
the protection period, the knowledge devolves on society. In other words, the 
technology may be adopted in products and processes by everyone. Furthermore, 
patents facilitate disclosure of inventions. Subsequent to the issuing of a patent, there is 
less need to keep the invention a secret because the inventor does not have to physical 
control of the invention since a patent provides a judicial control. 13 Society is best 
served when everyone can prosper from the inventions created. 
 
                                                     
10 Bently and Sherman 2001 p. 309.  
11 Lesser 2000 p.54.  
12 See for example Bently and Sherman 2001 p. 340. 
13 There are a set of different theories explaining the ideological basis for the patent system. One 
is based on the inventors natural right to an invention (the nature-law thesis), others are the 
reward-by-monopoly thesis and monopoly-profit-incentive thesis. Yet another is based on the 
notion that patents promote the exchange of secrets. For a more detailed introduction to these 
theories see for example Petrusson 1999, Moore 1997 and Stenvik 2001 pp. 92-137. 
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Several criteria must be met before a patent is granted. The subject matter has to be an 
invention, has to be new, involve an inventive step and be suited for industrial 
application. In addition to these criteria, the type of subject matter sought protection for 
has to be patentable.14 The regulations concerning plant and animal varieties are 
exceptions from patentability.15 Subject matter generally exempted from patentability in 
this manner is not put to the ordinary patent criteria test. It is rejected on a general basis 
even if the concrete subject matter might fulfil the other patent requirements. The 
exception at hand excludes one certain scope, namely plant and animal variety, from 
patentability.  
 
Structurally, the patent system can be divided into three main stages: The subject matter 
has to be patentable; the product or process has to meet the patent criteria mentioned in 
the previous paragraph; and the scope of the patent claim has to be determined. The 
problem discussed in this thesis is, as outlined above, the legal understanding the terms 
plant and animal varieties. As a starting point, all products or processes are patentable. 
Any exception to this main rule must have a valid, legal basis as for example the 
exception for variety. Therefore, the question at hand structurally belongs in the first 
stage, patentability. The connection to the scope of the patent claim is interesting: patent 
examiners may limit the scope of the patent claims in each concrete case. In general, the 
scope of the patents is not supposed to exceed what is seen as an advantage for the 
technical development in society as a whole. The variety exception can be seen as a 
method to exclude one particular scope of subject matter from patentability per se 
                                                     
14 For a detailed presentation of the patent criteria, see for example Bently and Sherman 2001 pp. 
362-468 or Stenvik 1999 pp. 112-231. 
15 See Article 52 (1) EPC cf. Article 53 (b) EPC and Article 3, first paragraph in the EC Patent 
Directive cf. Article 4, first paragraph in the EC Patent Directive. 
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instead of limiting the patent claim of each patent application in relation to the 
assessments which gives the grounds for the current variety exception.16 This thesis 
examines the limits and reasons for such an exception.  
 
Plant varieties can be protected by plant breeder’s rights. Plant breeder’s rights are an 
alternative intellectual property rights system. The world leading plant breeder’s rights 
system is constituted through The International Convention for the Protection of New 
Varieties of Plants, the UPOV Convention. Both the Patent Directive and EPC use the 
definition of variety used in the 1991 version of UPOV. The definition is used in the 
patent systems when identifying subject matter that is not patentable due to the 
exception for plant and animal varieties in Article 53 (b) EPC and Article 4, first 
paragraph, litra a in the EC Patent Directive. Furthermore, statements in EPC case law 
and legal theory indicates that the reason for constructing a variety exception in EPC 
and the Patent Directive was a practical division of work between UPOV and the patent 
systems.17 UPOV contributed to this classification by introducing a double protection 
ban.18 The ban forbids UPOV protection for subject matter which is patented. 
Consequently, both UPOV-61 and -78, EPC and the Directive all contribute to keeping 
the protection of plant varieties and other categories of plants apart. In the 1991 version 
of UPOV the double protection ban was not continued. An important question is how 
UPOV affects the patent systems. Specifically, in what manner the fact that the double 
protection ban no longer applies affects the interpretation of the term variety in EPC and 
                                                     
16 This is discussed further in Chapter 7 in relation to the problematic aspects of too broad patent 
claims.  
17 See for example Paterson 1992 pp. 335-336, Bently and Sherman 2001 p. 396 and T 49/83, 
points 2 and 4 of the Reasons. 
18 Article 2 in UPOV-61 and UPOV-78. 
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the Directive. Thus, an assessment of the relationship between the patent systems and 
UPOV is carried out in Chapter 5.  
  
 In a broader context, the variety exception can be seen in relation to other international 
agreements. The Convention on Biological Diversity, CBD, seeks inter alia to facilitate 
‘fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic 
resources’.19 This can, together with Article 15 CBD and the Bonn Guidelines20, be seen 
as a reflex of increased patenting of genetic resources.21 The relation between patents 
and CBD has been addressed by CBD Conference of the Parties. It asked the World 
Intellectual Property Organisation, WIPO to comment on the issue. The WIPO 
Intergovernmental Committee on Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and 
Folklore has discussed the relation between intellectual property rights and CBD, 
however it has not yet come to a clear conclusion on the posed question.22 The 
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food- and Agriculture, IT-PGRFA, 
was negotiated under the Food and Agriculture Organisation negotiations as a 
supplement to CBD on the issues of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture.23 
The relation between intellectual property rights and access to genetic resources is also 
important in this respect.24 Thematically, the relation between patents and access and 
                                                     
19 Article 1 CBD. 
20 Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing of the 
Benefits Arising out of their Utilization.  
21Nordic Gene Resource Council 2002, Chapter 2. See also Rosendal 1999 p. 97 and pp. 106-113 
and Tvedt 2001 p. 19.  
22 Nordic Gene Resource Council 2002, Chapter 2. 
23 Ibid.. 
24 Ibid..  
  7 
 
benefit sharing regarding genetic resources falls outside that scope of this thesis. It is 
therefore not discussed further in any depth.  
 
1.2 The variety exceptions: a topic of current interest  
 
The question of patenting plants and animals has become a current issue of interest due 
to technological evolution. Modern biotechnology opens for manipulation of plants and 
animals which in turn renders fulfilment of the patent requirements possible.25 For 
example, gene manipulation can make reproducible changes in plants and animals 
possible. Such techniques can implicate that the invention requirement can be fulfilled. 
The definition of plant and animal varieties contributes to the determination of to what 
extent plants and animals may be patented. This makes determining the scope of the 
variety exception important. Furthermore, the understanding of the scope of the variety 
exception has factual consequences. For example, the legal understanding of the variety 
exception may affect the technological progress in this field. On the one hand, a wide 
interpretation of the terms may result in hampering development because a large 
proportion of plant and animal subject matter is not patentable. In other words, a range 
of products and processes may not be invented or brought to market due to the lack of 
patent protection that could contribute to making the development profitable. This may 
especially be a challenge for subject matter which has no adequate alternative 
protection, such as subject matter defined as an animal variety.26 Since there is no 
alternative intellectual property protection for such inventions, and a monopoly situation 
                                                     
25 For details on biotechnology, see Chapter 1.4. 
26 See Chapter 5.7. 
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therefore is not afforded, the prospects of profit can be reduced. This may contribute to 
a situation were these inventions to a lower degree are brought to market.  
 
On the other hand, a narrow interpretation of the variety exception may result in more 
patents being granted. This may contribute to a situation where research and 
development are limited due to patent stacking.27 The theory is that the development 
cost increases beyond the point of profitability due to cost connected to licence charges. 
Consequently, some inventions may not be brought to market. An identification and 
assessment of these consequences requires an empiric examination of research and 
development materialising in patented inventions over an adequate period of time. To 
investigate this aspect an examination based on methodology other than a legal analysis 
is needed. Such an investigation would also be time-consuming. Therefore, due to 
methodical and volume reasons, this is beyond what can be presented in this thesis.  
 
The European legal situation is in a development stage, and it therefore becomes 
interesting to assess the evolvement. The Patent Directive has currently been 
implemented by seven countries out of a total of fifteen.28 The low degree of 
implementation is partly connected to scepticism towards the EC approach to 
patentability of plant and animal subject matter.29 The European Patent Convention is 
also in a process concerning patents for plants and animals. Both case law and 
                                                     
27 See for example Heller and Eisenberg 1998. 
28 The Patent Directive is implemented by Denmark, Finland, the United Kingdom, Ireland, 
Spain, Portugal and Greece. See press release from the European Commission, IP/03/991. 
Available on www.europa.eu.int. Accessed on 10 November 2003. 
29 See European Court of justice, C-377/98R, The Netherlands v. Council of the European Union 
and European Parliament. 
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amendments made to the Convention in the Implementing Regulations, contribute to the 
development of the variety exception.30 There is also an interesting relationship between 
EPC and the Patent Directive which implies that the understanding of the variety 
exception in one of the regimes may be affected by the other. This is further assessed in 
Chapters 4.2.11 and 4.2.13. The UPOV Convention is not a patent treaty. Based on the 
UPOV Convention, national authorities grant intellectual property protection for plant 
varieties which is less extensive than patents. The Convention’s interface with the 
variety exception in EPC and the Patent Directive is, however, important for 
understanding the patent law on this particular issue. The relationship between plant 
breeder’s rights and patents results in interesting dynamics in the interface between the 
systems since the UPOV understanding of plant variety can affect the understanding of 
the term in the patent systems. The manner in which the scope of the variety exception 
is affected by the scope of protection afforded by the plant breeder’s rights system is 
therefore examined.31 Since all members of the European Community and EPC are 
parties to the TRIPs Agreement, it is interesting to assess how the term plant varieties is 
understood in TRIPs and if this understanding can affect the interpretation of the term in 
EPC and the Directive.  
 
1.3 Adjoining issues not discussed in this thesis 
 
The thesis is limited to a discussion of the interpretation of the terms plant and animal 
variety in EPO and EC. Other agreements are not discussed in detail. However, due to 
the possible influence from UPOV and WTO on the interpretation of the terms in EPO 
                                                     
30 See Chapters 4.2.1-4.2.8 and 4.2.10. 
31 See Chapter 5. 
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and EC, the UPOV Convention and the TRIPs Agreement are discussed in relation to 
the understanding of plant and animal variety under EPC and the Directive. Other 
regional patent systems based on public international law are not assessed since the 
focus of this thesis is the European approach to the patentability of plants and animals. 
Furthermore, the thesis presents patent law from the perspective of public international 
law. National patent law is thus not examined, neither national patent law from 
European states nor other countries. National patent law in European states is to a large 
extent based on the rules presented in EPC and the Patent Directive. The provisions do 
therefore not diverge to a large degree. However, the practice of the different states may 
be divergent. An assessment of European national patent laws regarding patentability of 
plants and animals is therefore, besides falling outside an investigation of inter- and 
super-national patent regulations, too extensive for the size of this thesis.  
 
The presentation does not include an examination of the part of Article 53 (b) EPC and 
Article 4 first paragraph litra b of the Patent Directive which excludes ‘essentially 
biological processes for the production of plants and animals’ from patentability. The 
thesis is also delimited regarding examining the patentability of ‘microbiological and 
other technical processes and the products thereof’.32 This is an exception to the 
exception that ‘essentially biological processes for the production of plants and animals’ 
are non-patentable subject matter.33 Based on an ordinary understanding of the wording, 
both the exception and the exception to the exception are related to process claims and 
derived product claims. The variety exception concerns ‘plant and animal varieties’.34 
                                                     
32 Article 4 paragraph 3 of the Directive and Article 53 (b) EPC, cf. Rule 23c (c) of the EPC 
Implementing Regulations. 
33 Article 4 paragraph 1 (b) of the Directive and Article 53 (b) EPC. 
34 Article 4 paragraph 1 (a) of the Directive and Article 53 (b) EPC. 
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The wording of this exception indicates that it is limited to product claims. Since the 
above mentioned provisions concerns process claims, while the variety exception 
concerns product claims, the thesis does not therefore assess ‘essentially biological 
processes for the production of plants and animals or microbiological and other 
technical processes and the products thereof’.  
 
 In both EPC and the Patent Directive, there is a provision excepting from patentability 
subject matter which is contrary to ordre public and moral. This exception is not 
covered by this thesis presentation. The ordre public rule is distinct from the variety 
exception because it does not, like the latter, exclude one particular subject matter from 
patentability. It functions as a security clause. It gives the patent granting authorities and 
competent courts an opportunity to avoid granting patents for inventions unwanted by 
society. It may be argued that this is not a task for the patent authorities. Patents give a 
right to exclude others from using the patented invention for certain purposes. It cannot 
be seen as permission to make use of the invention. This is, in principle, left to other 
legislation to decide. Nevertheless, an ordre public rule is present in EPC and the Patent 
Directive, and hence in most national patent legislation in Europe.35 Even though the 
ordre public rule is not examined, it is important to be aware of a link between the two 
exceptions. If the object and purpose of the variety exception is to except ethically 
questionable inventions from patentability, the interface between the two exceptions 
may be overlapping. However, strong indications suggest that the object and purpose of 
                                                     
35 Not all countries in the world have an ordre public rule in their patent legislation. See for 
example the Canadian Patent Act which can be accessed on 
www.sice.oas.org/int_prop/nat_leg/Canada/ENG/lippec.asp. Accessed on 10 November 2003. 
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the variety exception, at least for plants, is not based on ethical consideration, but rather 
the relationship to sui generis plant variety protection.36 
 
This thesis does not address questions related to patenting of human subject matter. 
Although humans may be considered as animals in a biological sense, certain features 
require a distinct legal status for humans. In particular, ethical questions must be 
assessed in view of the special position held by the human race. The results of these 
considerations may diverge from the results for other animals. Furthermore, there are, 
de lege lata, provisions specifically regulating patenting of human subject matter.37 
These provisions indicate that animal or animal variety is not to be understood as to 
include human subject matter.38 
 
1.4 Biological understanding of plant and animal variety  
 
In this thesis the legal concept, and not the biological concept, of plant and animal 
variety is examined. Based on an intuitive understanding of the terms plant and animal 
variety used in EPC and the Directive, it may be natural to assume that the legal 
understanding of the terms are founded on the biological understanding of the terms. As 
it turns out, however, these two understandings of the terms might not be coherent 
because there is no clear biological understanding of the terms.39 Nevertheless, there is a 
                                                     
36 See Chapter 4.2.9. 
37 See for example Article 6 (2), litra a-c of the Directive, Article 53 (c) EPC and Article 27.3 (a) 
TRIPs. 
38 Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2002 p. 34.  
39 Hellstadius 2001 p. 41. 
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close relation between them. Therefore, in order to understand the basis for the legal 
argumentations and the problems they create, there is a need to address the biological 
meaning of the terms. 
 
It is important to note that this chapter, concerning biology, is not intended to hold any 
position as a source of law. The discussions are merely background material for the 
assessment of legal questions and are based on communication with experts on the field 
of biology, presented as I have understood them. 40   
 
In this and the following paragraph the biological understanding of plant variety and 
animal variety are outlined. The term plant variety is, in biology, a term which 
expresses a group of plants with certain common traits. There are also a number of other 
scopes of plant categories. Each category constitutes a taxonomical level, also known as 
a rank. The taxonomical system is a method for classification and naming living 
organisms.41 The system has a hierarchic structure.42 The higher and more general 
category comprises the lower categories. The taxonomical system for plants is presented 
below, starting with the highest level: 
 
 ‘Kingdom 
 Phylum 
                                                     
40 This chapter is mainly based on personal communication with Director of the Nordic 
Genebank for Domesticated Animals Erling Fimland, Professor Åsmund Bjørnstad from the 
Norwegian School of Agriculture and Senior Advisor Håkon Sønju from the Norwegian 
Agricultural Inspection Service on 20 February 2003. 
41 Robinson 1996 p. 447. 
42 For a brief introduction to the character of this hierarchy, see Mayr 1982 p. 205.  
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 Class 
 Order 
 Family 
 Genus 
 Species 
 Variety’.43 
 
As the list of the categories shows, the term variety has the lowest rank. The term 
variety is not used by all taxonomists. Some regard species as the base rank, but 
recognise variety as an infraspecific rank below that of subspecies.44  Biologically, plant 
variety is therefore not clearly defined.45 Variety has been the relevant taxonomical 
category for the production of new plants and thus important for the industry more so 
than for taxonomists. The definition used by the plant production industry today has 
evolved through an interaction between biology and the industry. This definition has 
been the basis for the legal definition of plant variety used in the UPOV-91 Convention, 
EPC and the EC Patent Directive.46  
 
The taxonomical system for animals is in many ways similar to the one for plants. There 
are, however, some major differences. First of all the relevant category for animal 
                                                     
43 See for example Wilson 1993 p. 144 and the World Biodiversity Database on 
www.eti.uva.nl/database/WBD.html. Accessed on 10 November 2003.  
44 See for example Judd...(et al.) 2002 p. 553. 
45 Hellstadius 2001 p. 41. 
46 Article 1 (vi) of UPOV-91, Article 53 (b) EPC cf. Rule 23b (4) of EPC Implementing 
Regulation and Article 2, third paragraph of the Patent Directive cf. Article 5 of the EC 
Community Plant Variety Rights Regulation. 
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breeders is breed and not variety. The term breed is widely used to classify animals with 
common characteristics on a taxonomical level lower than species.  There is no clear 
definition of the term. Generally, breed is closer to individuals than varieties. The 
concept of variety is based on a certain degree of uniformity within the selection. 
Animals cannot have this high degree of uniformity. The reason for this is that animals 
are more exposed to the negative effects of inbreeding. Plants seem not to be affected by 
such problems to the same extent. This is related to the methods of reproduction. Some 
plants are clones (e.g. potato), some cross-pollinate (e.g. flowers), while yet others are 
self-pollinating (e.g. corn). Furthermore, the size and monetary value of each individual 
may also explain the different approaches for plants and animals. One animal individual 
is generally more economically profitable than one plant individual. An operational unit 
needs fewer animal individuals than plant individuals to be profitable. This is mirrored 
in the way the individual is recognised and valued. Animal individuals are generally the 
centre of the breeder’s attention. The breeder is interested in the characteristics of a 
particular animal. Mating this individual with his stock, he hopes that the desired 
properties will be introduced in the new generation of animals. The focus on animal 
individuals reduces the need to classify animals in groups. A legitimate question is then 
why animal variety is exempted from patentability. This question is discussed further in 
Chapter 4.2.9. 
2 Introduction of the regimes 
 
In this chapter the European Patent Organisation, the European Community, the World 
Trade Organisation and the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of 
Plants are introduced. This is done to establish a platform of general information needed 
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for the subsequent discussions and to emphasise why the presented regimes are relevant 
to this thesis.  
 
2.1 The European Patent Organisation 
 
The European Patent Organisation was established in 1978 to strengthen cooperation on 
patent protection between European states.47 Currently, the Organisation has 19 member 
states.48 The European Patent Organisation consists of the Administrative Council and 
the European Patent Office, hereinafter EPO.49 The Organisation is concerned with the 
granting of European patents. Thus, the organisation assesses the validity of patents, but 
is not involved in the enforcement.50 The latter is dealt with on the national level. The 
legal basis for the cooperation is the Convention on the Grant of European Patents, 
commonly referred to as the European Patent Convention or EPC. EPC was signed in 
1973 and entered into force in 1978. One of the exceptions examined in this thesis is 
found in Article 53 (b) EPC. This provision, which make EPC relevant to the present 
                                                     
47 See the first paragraph of the preamble of EPC. 
48 See http://www.european-patent-
office.org/epo/facts_figures/facts2001/pdf/facts_figures_01.pdf. Accessed on 10 November 
2003. Norway has signed, but not ratified EPC. According to Protocol 28 EEC Art. 3 (4), 
however, Norway must fulfil its material content. See Stenvik 1999 p. 33. 
49 Article 4 EPC. The Organisation and the Office are sometimes confused because there seems 
to be no uniform understanding of the abbreviations. EPO is used for both the Organisation and 
the Office. In many cases it is not necessary to distinguish between the two. Therefore, a 
distinction will only be made when required to understand the point of law being discussed. In 
these situations the Organisation’s and Office’s full names are used. 
50 Paterson 1992 p. 2. 
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thesis, complements the main rule of patentability in Article 52 EPC, as it exempts plant 
and animal varieties from patent protection.  
 
EPC provides an opportunity for a two instance examination of all patent applications 
made to EPO. The first instance consists of various sections and divisions. Relevant for 
the assessment of EPO case law are the Examining Division and the Opposition 
Division. The second instance is the Boards of Appeal. Case law from the Boards of 
Appeal is one source of law contributing to a basis for the interpretation of plant and 
animal variety in EPO.51 This is taken into account, and EPO case law is discussed in 
Chapters 4.2.1-4.2.8. The Boards of Appeal is normally made up of three members with 
both legal and technical background. When made up of three members the second 
instance is called Technical Board of Appeal. If a Technical Board of Appeal is 
uncertain how to interpret EPC on a particular point of law, it can refer the question to 
the Enlarged Board of Appeal. The Enlarged Board of Appeal has five members instead 
of three, but the Enlarged Board of Appeal is not a separate instance of appeal. Even 
though decisions and opinions from the Enlarged Board of Appeal gives no formal 
precedence, in the sense that the subsequent Enlarged Boards of Appeal, Technical 
Boards of Appeal, and first instance organs are obligated to comply with the rulings, 
they have a tendency to do so if there are no good reasons not to. This is a consequence 
of EPO’s hierarchic structure and the fact that EPO aims to instil confidence by making 
their practice predictable.52 Consequently, case law from the Technical- and Enlarged 
                                                     
51 Article 31, second paragraph, litra b of the Vienna Convention.  
52 This paragraph is based on EPC Part I, Chapter III and IV, The Rules of Procedure of the 
Boards of Appeal (RPBA) and Paterson 1992 pp. 45-56. A more detailed introduction with 
further references to the structure of EPO is presented in Paterson 1992 on the mentioned pages. 
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Boards of Appeal may be applied as sources of law in the assessments of the 
interpretation of plant and animal variety in EPC.  
 
 The Implementing Regulations to the European Patent Convention give supplementing 
rules to EPC. According to Article 164 (1) EPC, the Implementing Regulations are an 
integral part of the Convention. In case of conflict between provisions in EPC and the 
Implementing Regulations, the Convention shall prevail.53 The Implementing 
Regulations can therefore be seen as a source of law relevant to the interpretation of 
plant and animal variety under EPO.54 The Examining Divisions often base their 
practice on the Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office.55 The 
Guidelines are not binding to the Technical- and Enlarged Boards of Appeal.56 
Nevertheless, the Guidelines are of some value as source of law since the Examining 
Divisions can, in most cases, be expected to follow them.57 
 
2.2 The European Community 
 
The European Community presently lacks a common patent system for its members. 
Attempts have been made through the establishment of the Community Patent 
Convention, CPC. This convention was signed by nine member states in 1975. Due to 
                                                     
53 Article 164 (2) EPC.  
54 Paterson 1992 p. 5. 
55 Paterson 1992 p. 6.  
56Article 23 (3) EPC and for example T 162/82. 
57 Paterson 1992 p. 6. 
  19 
 
political reasons CPC has not entered into force.58 There is an ongoing process which 
may result in a future introduction of a Community Patent.59 When this process will 
materialise into a functioning system is unclear. Instead the European Community, 
hereinafter EC, has decided to further harmonise the patent legislation regarding 
biotechnological invention within the EC through Directive 98/44/EC. The Directive, 
also referred to as the Patent Directive, is relevant to this thesis because the patentability 
of plant and animal varieties is regulated in Article 4, first paragraph, litra a of the 
Directive. According to the provision plant and animal varieties are exempted from 
patentability. This is an exception from the main rule in Article 3, first paragraph of the 
Directive.  
 
The Directive is controversial, and only implemented by seven states.60 The Netherlands 
summoned the European Council and the European Parliament before court trying to 
suspend the legislation.61 The Netherlands argued that, amongst other, the directive does 
not eliminate the uncertainty related to the interpretation of terms in relevant, 
international conventions. On the contrary, they argued, it merely created a new, 
separate body of law inconsistent with conventions regulating the field.62 Stenvik argues 
that the controversy related to 98/44/EC had, and still has, its basis in a general, emotive 
scepticism towards manipulation of plants and animals,63 and consequently, also 
                                                     
58 Paterson 1992 p. 22 and Commission Green Paper 2002 p. 2. 
59 Commission Green Paper 2002 p. 4. 
60 These are: The United Kingdom, Denmark, Finland, Greece and Ireland. Portugal and Spain. 
61 European Court of Justice, C-377/98R. 
62 Point 12 of the judgement, C-377/98R.   
63 Stenvik 1999 II p. 257. 
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towards the legal protection of the products of such acts.64 In contrast to Stenvik, 
Fauchald does not agree that a general, scarcely substantiated scepticism is the only 
argumentation which can be applied against the Patent Directive. In Fauchald 2001 he 
argues that the relation to access to genetic resources and benefit sharing of the profit of 
products based on such resources may suffer under a strong patent regime.65 This may 
in turn affect the possibility to legally obtain genetic material needed for the 
development of new products and thus a patent system can actually weaken the very 
development it is set to promote. However, the Court did not find that the Directive 
should be suspended. The European Council is currently summoning EC members 
reluctant to implement the Directive before the European Court of Justice.66 
 
The conflict within the European Community is strictly speaking not relevant to the 
assessments in this thesis because the Directive, in spite of the conflict, expresses the 
current legal situation on these points of law on the Community level. How the 
Directive is implemented in the national legislation of the EC member states is not 
discussed in this thesis since a delimitation is made regarding assessment of national 
patent legislation.67 
                                                     
64 C-377/98R point 9 of the Judgement. 
65 Fauchald 2001. 
66 See press release from the Commission, IP/03/991, available on www.europa.eu.int. Accessed 
on 10 November 2003. 
67 See Chapter 1.3. 
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2.3  The World Trade Organisation 
 
The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, TRIPs, is a 
convention under the World Trade Organization, WTO. It was negotiated between 1986 
and 1994 as a part of the Uruguay Round.68 The TRIPs Agreement is included as Annex 
1c of The Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO. As of April 2003 there where 
146 WTO member countries.69 Relevant in relation to the questions discussed in this 
thesis is Article 27 (3) (b) TRIPs. The provision sets minimum standards for intellectual 
property protection for plant and animal subject matter and is an exception from the 
main rule of patentability in Article 27 (1) TRIPs.  
 
2.4  The International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants 
 
The International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, UPOV, is not a 
patent system and is not directly examined in this thesis which has a patent perspective. 
Nevertheless, a short introduction to UPOV is given here. As the discussions in the 
thesis show, there are strong connections between EPC and the Directive on the one 
hand and UPOV Convention on the other.70 In the assessment of the variety exception in 
EPC and the Directive, the interface between the patent systems and UPOV is essential 
since the variety exceptions in EPC and the Directive are based on the delimitation 
                                                     
68 See Matthews 2002 p. 29-45. 
69 http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm. Accessed on 10 November 
2003.  
70 See Chapter 5. 
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towards plant varieties protectable under the UPOV regime.71 In relation to TRIPs, the 
UPOV Convention is relevant when discussing the basis for the understanding of the 
term plant variety in TRIPs.72  
 
The UPOV Convention, administrated by UPOV, provides intellectual property 
protection for the subject matter plant varieties and is referred to as one type of a sui 
generis system.73 The typical applicant is a plant breeding company which is interested 
in commercial exclusivity for their new plant variety.  The plant breeder’s rights 
afforded by UPOV resemble patent protection in that an exclusive commercial right is 
granted the applicant. However, the scope of this right and the requirements to obtain it 
diverge from those of EPC and the Patent Directive. The UPOV Convention was first 
signed in 1962. Since then it has been revised in 1972. In 1978 a new convention was 
negotiated. 28 of a total of 53 UPOV members are bound by these older versions and 
have not accepted the newer ones. 25 states have ratified the revised convention of 
1991. In this latest revision, this system is evolving closer to patent protection. This is 
also why so many of the contracting parties of the 1978 convention have not ratified the 
1991 convention. The assessments in this thesis are based on the 1991 version of the 
UPOV Convention, hereinafter UPOV-91. 
                                                     
71 See Chapter 4.2.9. 
72 See Chapter 6.3.2. 
73 The term is Latin and means of a specific kind. This indicates that UPOV is a system of 
intellectual property protection for subject matter of a specific kind –plant varieties. 
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3 Methodological challenges  
3.1 Public international law 
 
The topic of this chapter is what methodology applies to the understanding of the legal 
questions that are to be assessed when interpreting the terms plant and animal variety in 
EPC. Although the basis for its interpretation is not mentioned explicitly in EPC, it is 
generally assumed that this convention is to be interpreted in accordance with 
customary rules of interpretation of public international law.74 The term plant varieties 
in the TRIPs Agreement is not interpreted independently in this thesis, but is examined 
as an auxiliary source of law to the understanding of the term plant variety in EPC and 
the Directive.75 It is therefore also relevant to assess the methodology applied in the 
interpretation of WTO law. Articles 3, second paragraph and 7 of the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Understanding emphasises that the methodology of public international law 
is to be applied in the interpretation of the TRIPs Agreement.76 Therefore, both EPC and 
TRIPs are treaties of public international law which are to be interpreted in accordance 
with customary rules of interpretation of public international law. 
 
The point of departure in public international law is that the sources of law are 
determined by the state’s practice.77 A widely used codification, which is generally 
                                                     
74 Paterson 1992 p. 24. 
75 See Chapter 6. 
76 See also Palmeter and Mavroidis 1998 p. 399. 
77 Oppenheim 1992 p. 25. 
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authoritative because it reflects state practice, is Article 38 (1) of the Statues of the 
International Court of Justice.78 This provision indicates that conventions, customs and 
general principles of law are primary sources of law, while judicial decisions and 
teachings of the most highly qualified experts on international law are considered 
subsidiary means of interpretation. While the Statues of the International Court of 
Justice express the codification of legal sources in public international law, the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, hereinafter the Vienna Convention, expresses the 
codification of customary law related to the interpretation of treaties.79 The 
interpretation of EPC and TRIPs is based on the text in the Vienna Convention.80 The 
methodological background for the discussions concerning EPO and WTO is therefore 
the customary rules of interpretation of public international law and the customary rules 
of interpretation of treaties. The methodical challenges involved in comparing public 
international law with EC law is addressed in Chapter 3.2.  
 
3.2 EC Law –A methodical challenge 
 
European Community law is based on treaties between the EC member states.81 In that 
respect EC law is public international law.82 Secondary legislation, such as the Patent 
                                                     
78 Ibid.  
79 Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention. 
80 For EPO: The Enlarged Board of Appeal applied this approach in case G 5/83. See also 
Paterson 1992 p. 25. For WTO: e.g. United States –Standards for Reformulated and 
Conventional Gasoline, WTO Doc. AB-1996-1, WT/DS2/AB/R, at 17 (May 20, 1996), 35 ILM 
603 (1996) and Palmeter and Mavroidis 1998 p. 406. 
81 See for example the Rome Treaty. 
82 Kapteyn and Themaat 1998 p. 77. 
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Directive has, however, more the character of internal law common to the member 
states.83 In this relation EC law deviates from public international law. The question is 
on the basis of which principles EC Directives are to be interpreted. As a starting point 
it can be said that the interpretation of EC Directives is based on the same principles as 
in Article 31, first paragraph of the Vienna Convention. This means that the wording, 
context and objectives of the Directive are to be taken into account. Such an 
understanding implicates that the basis for interpretation of public international law and 
EC law is similar to one another.84 Nevertheless, due to the EC’s aim to harmonise 
legislation within the Community underscored in Recital 5 of the Preamble of the Rome 
treaty, the European Court of Justice emphasises the advantages of a teleological 
approach to the interpretation of Directives and EC law in general.85 This does however 
not deviate considerably from the general aim to harmonise patent law which EPC is 
one result of.86 On this background the terms plant and animal variety in the EC Patent 
Directive and EPC are discussed simultaneously and, as a point of departure, interpreted 
on the basis of the same principles throughout the thesis. Where the approaches of EPO 
and EC are deviating, the differences are emphasised.   
 
When interpreting international law as an integral part of EC law the international 
agreement is, according to the European Court of Justice in the Polydor case, interpreted 
in accordance with the customary rules of international law on interpretation of treaties 
                                                     
83 Ibid.. 
84 Borgli and Arnesen 1993 p. 116. 
85 Ellis and Tridimas 1995 p. 563.  
86 Recital 1 and 2 of the preamble of EPC.  
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as codified in Article 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention.87 This approach is therefore 
applied when discussing the Patent Directive in relation to EPC and TRIPs. 
 
3.3 Other treaties as a source of law   
 
A reoccurring question in this thesis is whether one provision or term in a treaty can be 
taken into account as a source of law when interpreting a similar provision or term in 
another treaty. During the work on the thesis, this methodological question in particular 
has emerged and been necessary to assess in order to interpret the terms plant and 
animal variety. The question is important and of current interest due to the relationship 
between patent systems and plant variety protection which exists on the field of 
intellectual property protection of plants and animals. The answer to the question 
determines how EPC and the Patent Directive are discussed in relation to each other. It 
also determines how TRIPs and UPOV-91 affects the understanding of plant and animal 
variety in both EPC and the Directive. The approach to discuss this question and the 
conclusions of these discussions varies depending on which legal document is assessed 
in relation to EPC or the Directive. A presentation of this methodological issue is 
therefore not given here, but rather in relation to the chapters where the material legal 
questions are discussed.  
                                                     
87 C-270/80, Polydor Ltd & RSO Records Inc v. Harlequin Record Shops Ltd & Simons Records 
Ltd, (1982) ECR 329. See also Bourgeois 2000 p. 97.  
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4 Plant and animal variety in EPO and EC 
 
In this chapter the understanding of the terms plant and animal variety in the European 
Community and the European Patent Organisation is discussed. Thus, the question is 
what plant and animal subject matter is not seen as a plant or animal variety and 
therefore escapes the variety exceptions. The variety exceptions in the two patent 
systems are assessed and compared to each other. A simultaneous presentation is made 
since, as the assessment shows, the variety exceptions of EPC and the Directive are 
quite similar. Prospective divergence between the two exceptions is emphasised. In 
relation to the question in this chapter, the thesis assesses the limits of the variety 
exceptions. Hence, the challenge is to examine the limits of the terms in relation to 
patentable subject matter. Therefore, the presentation is divided into two parts: first, the 
variety exception is discussed in relation to patentable plant and animal categories 
superordinate to the variety level. Second, the terms plant and animal variety are 
delimited towards patentable subordinate categories.  
 
4.1 Wording  
 
Here, the question is how the terms plant and animal variety are understood in EPC and 
EC. The point of departure for the interpretation is the wording of the texts.88 Article 53 
(b) EPC makes this statement: 
 
‘European patents shall not be granted in respect of: plant or animal varieties….’ 
 
                                                     
88 The Vienna Convention Article 31, first paragraph. 
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 And Article 4, first paragraph, litra a of the Directive spells out this emphasis: 
 
 ‘The following shall not be patentable: Plant and animal varieties;.…’ 
 
According to the Vienna Convention, the ordinary meaning of the plant and animal 
varieties has to be established. The methodology of EC law does not diverge from this 
point of departure.89 First, it is emphasised that a contextual understanding of ‘plant and 
animal variety’ means that the term variety refers both to plant and to animal. The term 
variety is normally used in relation to taxonomical classification.90 Variety is then 
delimited towards other taxonomical levels. A linguistic approach, therefore, implies 
that the exception covers varieties as opposed to categories of plants and animals on 
other taxonomical levels. 
 
 The provisions have to be examined in accordance within their context.91 Article 53 (b) 
EPC and Article 4, first paragraph, litra a of the Directive are exceptions to the general 
rule in Article 52 (1) EPC and Article 3, first paragraph of the Directive. The point of 
departure is that all subject matter which fulfils the patent criteria and is not explicitly 
excluded from patentability shall be granted protection.92 This follows from Article 52 
(1): 
 
                                                     
89 See Borgli and Arnesen 1993 p. 116. 
90 See Chapter 2. 
91 The Vienna Convention Article 31, first paragraph. 
92 It is important to note that the substance, and not only the form of the claim is assessed. This 
indicates that applicants will not be granted a patent if they try to adapt the claim with mere 
linguistic alterations to comply with the requirements. See Bently and Sherman 2001 p. 397. 
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‘European patents shall be granted for any inventions which are susceptible of industrial 
application, which are new and which involve an inventive step.’93 
 
The Directive’s statement is similar:  
 
‘…inventions which are new, which involve an inventive step and which are susceptible 
of industrial application shall be patentable….’94 
 
This implies that the exception is not to be interpreted widely. The taxonomical levels 
that delimit variety, for example species or subspecies, are not defined in either EPC or 
the Directive. Consequently, little assistance can be found in these terms. The term plant 
variety is on the other hand defined in both texts. In the Implementing Regulations to the 
Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Rule 23b, plant variety is defined.95 Its 
paragraph 4 makes this statement: 
 
‘”Plant variety” means any plant grouping within a single botanical taxon of the lowest 
known rank, which grouping, irrespective of whether the conditions for the grant of 
plant variety right are fully met, can be: 
 
defined by the expression of the characteristics that results from a given genotype or 
combination of genotypes, 
                                                     
93 Article 52 (1) EPC. 
94 Article 3, first paragraph of the Directive. 
95 The Implementing Regulations are viewed as part of the relevant context the convention is to 
be assessed in.  This is emphasised in Enlarged Board of Appeal case G 5/83 and in Paterson 
1992 p. 24.  
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distinguished from any other plant grouping by the expression of at least one of the said 
characteristics, and 
considered as a unit with regards to its suitability for being propagated unchanged.’ 
 
In Article 2, third paragraph of the Patent Directive there is a reference to a definition 
given in Regulation (EC) No 2100/94 on Community plant variety rights.96 The 
Directive states that the term is to be interpreted in accordance with the definition in the 
Regulation. Plant variety is defined in the Regulation Article 5 (2): 
 
‘For the purpose of this Regulation, “variety” shall be taken to mean a plant grouping 
within a single botanical taxon of the lowest known rank, which grouping, irrespective 
of whether the conditions for the grant of a plant variety right are fully met, can be: 
defined by the expression of the characteristics that results from a given genotype or 
combination of genotypes, 
distinguished from any  other plant grouping by the expression of at least one of the said 
characteristics, and 
considered as a unit with regard to its suitability for being propagated unchanged.’ 
 
This definition is almost identical to the wording in the Implementing Regulation. One 
divergence is, however, found in the opening part of the definitions. In EPC the opening 
words are ‘”Plant variety” means…’, in EU it is stated that ‘For the purpose of this 
Regulation “plant variety” shall be taken to mean…’. These introduction phrases hold 
no legal meaning. In substance the two definitions are identical. Both definitions are 
also identical to the definition of plant variety as applied in UPOV from which they 
                                                     
96 Even though the scope of the Regulation is delimited to plant breeder’s rights, the definition 
given there is relevant due to the reference in the Directive. 
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originate.97 This emphasises the relation between patent protection and plant breeder’s 
rights. 
 
The term animal variety is not defined in either EPC or the Directive. This may be due 
to the fact that breed and not variety is the relevant category for animals.98 Furthermore, 
plant varieties may be protected by the UPOV Conventions. As for animal varieties no 
such alternative protection is available. The term plant variety is defined in UPOV-91.99 
The definitions of plant variety in EPC and the Directive have been inspired by the 
understanding of the term in UPOV.100 Since there is no alternative intellectual property 
protection for animal subject matter, a link to a sui generis system similar to the one for 
plant varieties, is missing for animal varieties. This may also contribute to explaining 
why animal variety is not defined in EPC or the Directive.  
 
Some scholars have discussed whether the definition of plant variety can be applied 
analogously to contribute to the understanding of the term animal variety.101 On the one 
hand, the terms are quite similar in that both terms are called variety. Thus, according to 
an ordinary meaning of the wording in Article 53 (b) EPC and Article 4, first paragraph, 
litra a of the Directive, an analogous interpretation  is an option. This can imply that the 
two terms are to be defined identically. On the other hand, it is necessary to emphasise 
the fact that no alternative intellectual property protection for animal varieties exists. 
Taking into account that the definition of plant variety is closely linked to the definition 
                                                     
97 Westerlund 2001 p. 322. 
98 See Chapter 1.4. 
99 Article 1 (vi) UPOV-91. 
100 Westerlund 2001 p. 322 and p. 324. 
101 See for example Westerlund 2001 p. 388. 
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in UPOV-91, and the desire to avoid protection for identical subject matter under both 
plant breeder’s rights and the patent systems, it is possible that the term animal variety 
should be interpreted differently since dual protection is not an issue for animal subject 
matter.102 Moreover, it is also possible that the actual and biological differences between 
plants and animals may give good reasons for interpreting the two terms in different 
ways.103 These two arguments suggest that an analogical interpretation of the term 
animal variety should not be applied. Based on this discussion, the following 
presentation is not grounded on an analogical application of the term plant variety for 
the interpretation of animal variety. This feature will pervade the discussion of object 
and purpose.104  
 
As seen in this chapter, the wording of the variety exception in EPC and the Directive 
does not determine the exact understanding of the exception. In the subsequent 
discussions other sources of law are assessed. In the following presentation variety is 
approached from two angles. The term variety is first assessed in relation to more 
general categories of plants and animals such as species and family. Because they are on 
a higher taxonomical level than variety these categories are as a collective term called 
superordinate taxonomical levels. This is examined in Chapter 4.2. Second, in Chapter 
4.3, the term is discussed in relation to biological levels subordinate to variety, such as 
individual specimens of plants and animals and microbiological material.  
 
                                                     
102 See Chapter 5. 
103 This argument is emphasised by Westerlund 2001 p. 389. 
104 See Chapter 5. 
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4.2 Superordinate taxonomical levels  
 
In the previous chapter the wording of the variety exceptions in relation to both the 
superordinate and the subordinate limitation was in focus. The question here is how the 
limits of plant and animal variety is determined in relation to categories of plant and 
animal subject matter on superordinate taxonomical levels. The understanding of the 
exceptions in relation to categories of superordinate taxonomical rank was first outlined 
in EPO case law. The variety exception has later been specified in accordance with the 
case law in both the EPC Implementing Regulations and the EC Directive. To give a 
chronological presentation, the case law is examined in the Chapters 4.2.1-4.2.8, before 
the codifications are assessed. The object and purpose of the limitation of the variety 
exception regarding categories of plants and animals of higher taxonomical rank is 
assessed in Chapter 4.2.9. 
 
4.2.1 EPO case law –introduction  
 
The topic here is to investigate how the term plant and animal variety has been 
interpreted in the case law of the Technical Board of Appeal and the Enlarged Board of 
Appeal. Seven cases from the European Patent Organisation particularly contribute to 
the understanding of the legal situation on this matter.105 The cases are the Ciba Geigy 
decision, 106 the Lubrizol decision,107 the Onco-mouse decision, 108 the Plant Genetic 
                                                     
105 In accordance with the Vienna Convention Article 31, second paragraph, litra b practice from 
EPO is examined. 
106 Ciba-Geigy/Propagating Material Application, T 49/83 (1979-85) C EPOR 758. 
107 Lubrizol/Hybrid plant, T 320/87 (1990) EPOR 173. 
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Systems decision, 109 Opinion G 3/95110, the Novartis I decision111 and the Novartis II 
decision112. The cases are important for the understanding of de lege lata because they 
discuss the issue of variety directly. One of the cases, the Onco-mouse case, concerns 
the term animal variety, while the other cases discuss the interpretation of plant variety. 
According to the Technical Board of Appeal, the Onco-mouse case is also relevant for 
the interpretation of plant variety due to the quality of the arguments presented.113 The 
Novartis II case is the most recent judgement assessing plant subject matter and can thus 
be expected to give an indication of the present legal situation for plants. The other 
cases give, to a various degree, alternative approaches and solutions to the questions. 
The question is if a plant variety or animal variety not specified in the patent application 
can be covered by patent regulation when the claims are related to a category of plants 
and animals on a higher taxonomical level. The cases are presented in the following 
chapters. To emphasise their importance and due to the attention given to them in terms 
of textual volume, the cases are assessed on the same level of heading as the other 
sources of law.  
 
                                                                                                                                               
108 Harvard/Onco-mouse, T 19/90 (1990) EPOR 501. 
109 Plant Genetic Systems/Glutamine synthetase inhibitors, T 356/93 (1995) EPOR 357. 
110 Inadmissible referral, G 3/95 (1995) EPOR 505. 
111 Novartis/Transgenic plant, T 1054/96 (1999) EPOR 123. 
112 Novartis/Transgenic plant, G 1/98 (2000) EPOR 303. 
113 T 356/93 point 30 0f the Reasons.  
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4.2.2 The Ciba Geigy case and the Lubrizol case 
 
In 1979 a company called Ciba Geigy applied for a patent on chemically treated plants 
for the purpose of making the plants resistant to agricultural chemicals. The application 
was first refused, but that decision was later appealed to the Technical Board of Appeal 
in 1983. The question in the Ciba Geigy case was to what extent patent claims which 
are not confined to one particular plant variety are patentable. In other words, if the 
exception in Article 53 (b) EPC is applicable when a patent is claimed for categories of 
plants on a higher taxonomical level. The Technical Board of Appeal made this 
argument: 
 
‘…, the subject-matter of claims 13 and 14 is not an individual variety of plant 
distinguishable from any other variety, but the claims relate to any cultivated plants in 
the form of their propagating material which have been chemically treated in a certain 
way. However, Article 53 (b) EPC prohibits only patenting of plants or their 
propagating material in the genetically fixed form of the plant variety.’114 
 
As the quotation indicates, the Technical Board of Appeal ruled that only claims 
confined to one single plant variety were to be excluded from patentability. This 
implicates that applications covering more than one plant variety are patentable. They 
based this conclusion on the wording of Article 53 (b) EPC and on the reasons for 
creating the exception: 
 
                                                     
114 T 49/83 point 3 of the Reasons. 
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‘Plant varieties were excluded from European patent protection mainly because several 
of the signatory states to the European Patent Convention have developed special 
protection for plant breeding at national and international level.’115  
 
The Technical Board of Appeal refers to one reason for excluding plant varieties from 
patentability: the unfavourable possibility for dual protection. It would mean that the 
rightholder was granted a too extensive a right, bringing the interplay between 
rightholder and society out of balance. Since there was a system of protection for plant 
varieties, they were exempted from patentability. Moreover, the 1961 and 1978 versions 
of the UPOV Convention had introduced an explicit double protection ban.116  
 
The Technical Board of Appeal then looked at the Strasbourg Patent Convention of 27 
November 1963 which is the predecessor of the European Patent Convention.117 Article 
53 (b) EPC strictly adhered to the wording of Article 2 (b) of the Strasbourg Patent 
Convention.118 With regard to the legal situation at the time of construction of the 
Strasbourg Patent Convention the Technical Board of Appeal made this statement:  
 
‘Even at that time the majority of the States represented on the Council of Europe were 
already of the opinion that plant varieties should be protected not by patents but by a 
special industrial property right.’119 
 
                                                     
115 T 49/83 point 4 of the Reasons. 
116 See Article 2 (1) in both conventions. 
117 See for example Paterson 1992 p. 16. 
118 See the Strasbourg Patent Convention Article 2 (b) cf. Article 53 (b) EPC. 
119 T 49/83, point 4 of the Reasons.  
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This statement supports the notion that the problems connected with dual protection 
were decisive in the creation of the variety exception. In accordance with the Vienna 
Convention, the Technical Board of Appeal can apply this understanding in their 
argumentation.120 The object of the provision is used in its interpretation. This leads to 
an interpretation of plant variety in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the term. 
The reference to the object and purpose of the provision was repeated in second of these 
two cases, the Lubrizol decision.121 This case concerned a certain kind of hybrid seed 
and the resulting plants. The Technical Board of Appeal came to the conclusion that the 
claimed product was not encompassed by the term plant variety. The patent application 
was therefore remitted to the Examining Division for further prosecution. 
 
The Ciba Geigy case refers to the object and purpose of the exception. These 
considerations were connected only to plants. Thus, the legal situation for animals 
remained uncertain since plant variety protection only is available for one particular 
subject matter, namely plant variety. The question is how the variety exception for 
animals is delimited contrary to the plant variety exception. The fact that there is no 
alternative protection system for animals requires that the dual protection ban 
argumentation cannot be applied for this group. The question was not addressed until 
1990, when the refusal of the Onco-mouse patent application was appealed before the 
Technical Board of Appeal.  
 
                                                     
120 See the Vienna Convention Article 31, first paragraph: ‘A treaty shall be interpreted… in the 
light of its object and purpose.’ 
121 T 320/87 point 12 of the Reasons.  
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4.2.3 The Onco-mouse case 
 
The Onco-mouse is a genetically modified mouse especially constructed to be exposed 
to cancer. The mice are used in cancer research as test animals. They are named after 
the gene introduced through genetic engineering; the onco gene. The patent claims were 
expressed more widely than one mouse variety. The inventors claimed patent rights for 
all non-human mammals with the inserted onco gene. The patent was ultimately granted 
for all rodents with the inserted onco gene.122 This scope is broader than a mouse, but 
narrower than all non-human mammals. The question was if an invention with such a 
scope was excluded from patentability. The Technical Board of Appeal expressed the 
view: 
 
 ‘In the decision under appeal the Examining Division interpreted     
Article 53 (b) EPC as excluding not only certain groups of animals from patentability 
but, in fact, animals as such. The Board is unable to accept this interpretation.’123 
 
The Technical Board of Appeal was of the opinion that only animal variety, and not 
categories of animals in other taxonomical levels, is excluded from patentability. The 
statement indicates that the Technical Board of Appeal chose to apply an interpretation 
in compliance with the ordinary meaning of the wording and parallel to the 
interpretation of plant variety presented in the previous chapter. The Technical Board of 
Appeal emphasised this point: 
 
                                                     
122 See www.european-patent-office.org/news/pressrel/2001_11_07_e.htm, accessed on 10 
November 2003.  
123 T 19/90 point 4.4 of the Reasons. 
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‘…Article 53 (b) EPC is an exception, for certain kinds of inventions, to the general rule 
under Article 52 (1) EPC that European patents “shall be” granted for all inventions 
which are susceptible of industrial application, which are new and involve an inventive 
step. Any such exception must, as repeatedly pointed out by the Boards of Appeal, be 
narrowly constructed.’124  
 
The Technical Board of Appeal stresses that an exception, under normal circumstances, 
is to be interpreted not only in the light of the wording, but also with respect for the 
main rule from which the exception derives. Consequently, when the main rule is 
widely formulated and only delimited by explicit exceptions, there is reason to adopt a 
restrictive and narrow understanding of the exceptions.  
 
As the examination above shows, the term animal variety is delimited negatively by the 
Technical Board of Appeal, in that it emphasises the terms relation to patentable subject 
matter. Plant variety on the other hand is, in addition to a negative delimitation, 
positively defined.125 The question to be posed here is whether animal variety was given 
a positive content by the Technical Board of Appeal which can contribute to the 
delimitation of the term towards categories of animals on superordinate taxonomical 
ranks. The Technical Board of Appeal says this: 
 
‘It is now the task of the European Patent Office to find a solution to the problem of the 
interpretation of Article 53(b) EPC with regard to the concept of "animal varieties", 
providing a proper balance between the interest of inventors in this field in obtaining 
                                                     
124 T 19/90 point 4.5 or the Reasons. 
125 See EPC Implementing Regulations Rule 23b, litra d were a positive definition of the term is 
given. 
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reasonable protection for their efforts and society's interest in excluding certain 
categories of animals from patent protection.’126 
 
Here, the Technical Board of Appeal gives an indication of the frames for defining the 
term. It emphasised the need for a definition which is balanced between the interests of 
the inventor and society. The Technical Board of Appeal did not, however, go any 
further with the assessment of the question at hand. Moreover, the Technical Board of 
Appeal discussed the comparison of the three original language versions of EPC. In the 
French version animal variety is called races animales, while in the German version 
Tierarten. The ordinary meaning of the term in the latter version diverges from the other 
two by encompassing the superordinate taxonomical rank species. Without being more 
concrete about the positive delimitation of animal variety, this understanding of the 
term was rejected by the Technical Board of Appeal. They did not give any clear reason 
for this argumentation. However, it was probably based on the principles laid down in 
Article 33, paragraph 4 of the Vienna Convention which regulates conflicts between 
equally authoritative language versions of a treaty. Some conventions may be written in 
different language versions that are all authoritative, in other words equally binding for 
the contracting parties. The question is what happens when the different versions give 
different results based on the interpretation of the wordings. Such conflicts are regulated 
in Article 33, paragraph 4 of the Vienna Convention.127 It is emphasised that the version 
                                                     
126 T 19/90 point 4.7 of the Reasons. 
127 Article 33, paragraph 4 of the Vienna Convention: ‘Except where a particular text prevails in 
accordance with paragraph 1, when a comparison of the authentic text discloses a difference of 
meaning which the application of articles 31 and 32 does not remove, the meaning which best 
reconciles the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of the treaty, shall be adopted.’  
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best promoting the object and purpose of the treaty is to make the basis for the 
interpretation. This means that teleological considerations are relevant when the 
versions cannot be harmonised. The version that brings the treaty closest to its 
intentions will prevail. It is also important to note that this article only comes into effect 
if harmonization is not possible. Many differences may be solved using Article 31, 
paragraph 1 of the Vienna Convention, where it is emphasised that treaties are to be 
interpreted in their context and in the light of their object and purpose. In this case the 
biological and ordinary meaning of the term Tierarten is, as discussed above, diverging 
from the terms used in the two other language versions. On this basis, it is possible that 
the Technical Board of Appeal founded their decision on such considerations. 
 
Even though it also here had the opportunity to examine the positive delimitation of 
animal variety, the Technical Board of Appeal did not do so. These two arguments 
show that contrary to plant variety, the term animal variety has not been positively 
defined by EPO. One consequence may be that the understanding of the two terms drift 
apart, opening for diverging practice of the variety exception for plants and animals. 
This could implicate that the limits of the plant variety exception may deviate from the 
limits of the plant variety exception.  
 
Even though the Onco-mouse decision concerns the term animal variety, the reasoning 
connected to the delimitation of the variety exception towards superordinate 
taxonomical levels has been regarded effective also for the understanding of the term 
plant variety.128 The Ciba Geigy case, the Lubrizol case and the Onco-mouse case 
seemed to clarify the understanding of the situation where the patent claims 
                                                     
128 See for example Westerlund p. 339 where T 19/90 is discussed in relation to the 
understanding of plant variety. 
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encompassed more than one plant variety so that such subject matter is not comprised 
by the variety exception.  
 
4.2.4 The Plant Genetic Systems case 
 
Uncertainty was created in the wake of the Plant Genetic Systems case.129 A patent was 
granted in 1990 by the Examining Division for specific plant cells resistant to glutamine 
synthetase inhibitors made by genetic engineering.130 In plain English, the invention 
comprised, among other claims, a genetically modified tobacco plant resistant to 
herbicides. The applicant was Plant Genetic Systems N.V.. Greenpeace opposed the 
granting of the patent. The case was admitted to the Technical Board of Appeal in 1993 
as case T 356/93. Their conclusion was that the invention was patentable, although in an 
altered form. The claims were limited in accordance to the Technical Board of Appeal’s 
ruling and protection was awarded the applicant.131 
 
The question relevant in this perspective was if and to what degree it was possible to 
grant patents for inventions encompassing plant varieties. To avoid the exclusion for 
plant varieties in Article 53 (b), the applicant claimed protection for a wider scope than 
a specific plant variety. The patent claims focus on ‘…non-variety specific enzymatic 
activity….’132 This means that the claims include more than the tobacco plant 
mentioned above. It is more general in its formulation, and not confined to one 
                                                     
129 See G 3/95 point II of the Summary of the procedure.  
130 See the title of the application. Application number: 87400141.5. 
131 T 356/93 point 44 of the Reasons. 
132 T 356/93 point 40.3 of the Reasons.  
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particular plant variety. With regards to the patentability of such claims the Technical 
Board of Appeal made this argument: 
 
‘A claim is not allowable if the grant of a patent in respect of the invention defines in 
said claim is conductive to an evasion of a provision of the EPC establishing an 
exception to patentability.’133 
 
This means that the Technical Board of Appeal wanted to avoid a situation where of the 
linguistic skills of the patent attorneys determines which patents can be granted. 
Furthermore, the Technical Board of Appeal emphasises that:  
 
‘Given the fact that Claim 21 encompasses plant varieties…, it follows therefore, that 
Claim 21 is only allowable, if the exception to patentability under Article 53 (b) EPC, 
first half-sentence, concerning plant varieties does not apply, because the subject-matter 
of this claim is to be regarded as the product of a microbiological process….’134 
 
The Technical Board of Appeal states that one cannot obtain protection for a plant 
variety merely because the claim also encompasses more than, and is more general than, 
a specific plant variety. The only situation where a patent can be granted is, according 
to the Technical Board of Appeal, where the subject matter is a product of a 
microbiological process and thus falls in under the exception from the variety exception 
in Article 53 (b), second half sentence.135 This was not the case for the Plant Genetic 
                                                     
133 T 1054/96 point 40.7 of the reasons. 
134 T 1054/96 point 40.8 of the reasons. 
135 Article 53 (b) EPC, second half sentence: ‘…this provision shall not apply to microbiological 
processes and the products thereof.’ 
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Systems application. Consequently, patent protection was not granted to Plant Genetic 
Systems for the invention in this general form.  
 
The Plant Genetic Systems case seems to take a stand opposite to the previous cases. 
The Ciba Geigy case, the Lubrizol case and the Onco-mouse case conclude that plant 
varieties are not patentable, while superordinate categories for plants are patentable. 
The results are based on diverging argumentation. Unlike the Technical Boards of 
Appeal in the Ciba Geigy case and the Lubrizol case, the Technical Board of Appeal in 
the Plant Genetic Systems case does not assess the object and purpose of the provision. 
Instead the question of evasion of the exception is brought into examination. The Onco-
mouse decision concerns animals, for which there is no alternative intellectual property 
protection. Since the object and purpose of the animal variety exception for that reason 
differs from that of the plant variety exception, the Onco-mouse decision can not be 
based on the same argumentation as the Ciba Geigy case and the Lubrizol case. The 
Onco-mouse decision is based on the variety exception’s relation to the main rule in 
Article 52 (1) EPC. The question of evasion was not touched upon. This divergence of 
both argumentation and result created uncertainty with regard to the legal situation on 
this point.  
 
4.2.5 Opinion G 3/95 
 
The President of EPO expressed uncertainty with regard to the case law from the 
Technical Board of Appeal. In his opinion the result in the Plant Genetic Systems case 
stood in contradiction to the results in the Ciba Geigy case and the Onco-mouse case.136 
                                                     
136 G 3/95 point VI of the Summary of the procedure.  
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According to Article 112 (1) (b) EPC, the President of EPO can refer a point of law to 
the Enlarged Board of Appeal where two Technical Boards of Appeal have given 
different decisions on a question. Therefore, on the 28 of July 1995 the President of 
EPO referred a question to the Enlarged Board of Appeal.137 He asked the Enlarged 
Board of Appeal to comment on the legal situation subsequent to the apparently 
conflicting decisions from the Technical Boards of Appeal in the Ciba Geigy case138 and 
the Onco-mouse case139 on the one hand and Plant Genetic Systems case140 on the other. 
The President’s question was this: 
 
‘Does a claim which relates to plants or animals but wherein specific plant or animal 
varieties are not individually claimed contravene the prohibition of patenting in Article 
53 (b) EPC if it embraces plant or animal varieties?’141 
 
The Enlarged Board of Appeal’s conclusion was that the cases were not conflicting.142 
They argued that the legal issues in the two groups of cases are in fact different.143 In the 
Plant Genetic Systems decision, the Enlarged Board argued, the Technical Board of 
Appeal reasoned that the genetically modified plant itself complied with the definition 
of a plant variety in the UPOV-91 Convention and was thus not patentable within the 
meaning of Article 53 (b) EPC. In other words, the claimed invention did not include 
                                                     
137 G 3/95. 
138 T 49/83. 
139 T 19/90. 
140 T 356/93. 
141 G 3/95 point I in the summary of the procedure. 
142 G 3/95 point 8 of the Reasons. 
143 G 3/95 point 8 of the Reasons. 
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within its scope more than one plant variety, but was in fact a plant variety. The two 
other cases dealt, according to the Enlarged Board of Appeal, with the question of more 
than one variety within the scope of a patent. Consequently, the President’s question 
was answered with the notion that there was no contradiction between the cases. 
Furthermore, that the Ciba Geigy case and the Onco-mouse case expressed the legal 
situation with regard to inventions encompassing more than one variety. In other words, 
inventions comprising more than one variety are patentable. 
 
An important question to assess is how this opinion was interpreted in subsequent case 
law from the Technical Board of Appeal and the Enlarged Board of Appeal. As 
explained in Chapter 2.1, there is no formal precedence in EPO. Nevertheless, a practice 
from the Enlarged Board of Appeal is continued if there are no particular reasons not to 
do so. Thus, strong reasons have to indicate an alternative argumentation or result. In 
this case the Enlarged Board of Appeal expressed quite clearly how this point of law is 
to be interpreted. This points towards a coherent understanding of subsequent practice 
from the Technical Board of Appeal and the Enlarged Board of Appeal.  
 
4.2.6 The Novartis I case 
 
Even though the Enlarged Board of Appeal was of the understanding that the legal 
situation was unambiguous, others, such as the company Novartis AG, were not so 
certain of the legal content of Article 53 (b) EPC. A patent application was submitted by 
Novartis for genetically modified plants containing transgens making them resistant to 
fungi. The patent application was launched as a test patent after the strict ruling, from 
  47 
 
plant innovators’ point of view, in the Plant Genetic Systems case.144 The patent 
application would, if granted, give the applicant, Novartis, patent protection for non-
specifically claimed plant varieties embraced by the patent claims. Novartis calls this 
the ‘more than a single variety’ approach.145 The patent application, with application 
number No. 91810144.5, was refused by the Examining Division because it was 
covered by the exception in Article 53 (b) EPC. This decision was appealed by the 
applicant and was admitted by the Technical Board of Appeal in 1996 as case T 
1054/96. In the Plant Genetic Systems case the Technical Board of Appeal held that, as 
explained above, patent protection was not granted for patents encompassing plant 
varieties.  
 
Consequently this meant, according to the Examining Division, that a patent could not 
be granted for an invention like the Novartis application where a plant variety was part 
of the invention, but not specifically claimed. The Technical Board of Appeal took the 
same stand in this statement: 
 
‘To deduce from this wording of Article 53 (b) EPC that a patent shall not be granted 
for a single plant variety but may be granted if its claims cover more than one variety, 
does not appear to comply with the normal rules of logic.’146 
 
This means that the Technical Board of Appeal objected to the ‘more than a single 
variety’ approach.147 However, the Technical Board of Appeal was uncertain of this 
                                                     
144 See a brief comment on the case in the European Intellectual Property Report, 2000 p. N-49. 
145 T 1054/96 point 32 of the Reasons. 
146 T 1054/96 point 36 of the Reasons. 
147 T 1054/96 point 32 of the Reasons. 
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reasoning.148 They therefore referred four questions to the Enlarged Board of Appeal, 
one of which is relevant in this context:149  
 
‘Does a claim which relates to plants but wherein specific plant varieties are not 
individually claimed ipso facto avoid the prohibition on patenting in Article 53 (b) EPC 
even though it embraces plant varieties?’150 
 
The question is identical in content to the question referred by the President of EPO to 
the Enlarged Board of Appeal in Opinion G 3/95 discussed above. On that occasion the 
Enlarged Board of Appeal avoided commenting to a great extent on its opinion in this 
matter. The Enlarged Board of Appeal concluded, however in accordance with Ciba 
Geigy case and the Onco-mouse case that patents embracing plant varieties are covered 
by the exception in Article 53 (b) EPC. In the Novartis I case the Technical Board of 
Appeal came to no formal conclusion other than referring questions to the Enlarged 
Board of Appeal. However, in their argumentation they suggested that categories of 
plants on taxonomical levels superordinate to plant variety should be covered by the 
variety exception.151 
                                                     
148 T 1054/96 point 37 of the Reasons. 
149 The answers to the questions are given in Opinion G 1/98 which is discussed in the following 
chapter. See Article 112 (1) (a) EPC.  
150 T 1054/96 point 31 of the Reasons. 
151 T 1054/96 point 36 of the Reasons. 
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4.2.7 The Novartis II case 
 
On this background the question was referred to the Enlarged Board of Appeal in 1998 
and assessed as case G 1/98.152 The Enlarged Board of Appeal made a contrasting 
argument to the Technical Board of Appeal in Novartis I: 
 
‘If the intention to exclude plants as a group embracing in general varieties as products, 
the provision would use the more general term plants as used for the processes.’153 
 
This means that According to the Enlarged Board of Appeal, the ordinary meaning of 
the wording does not indicate that categories of plants on superordinate taxonomical 
levels are exempted from patentability. The Enlarged Board of Appeal assumes that the 
contracting parties of EPC would not use the category plant variety if their intention 
was to except all forms of plants from patentability.  
 
The Enlarged Board of Appeal also emphasised the historical background of the variety 
exception. In the view of the Enlarged Board of Appeal, the relationship to the UPOV 
Convention speaks in favour of a narrow interpretation of the exception.154 Furthermore, 
they pointed out practical reasons for limiting the variety exception to comprise only 
plant varieties:  
 
                                                     
152 The Novartis II case. 
153 G 1/98 point 3.3.1 of the Reasons. 
154 G 1/98 points 3.4 to 3.7 of the Reasons. 
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‘The inventor would not obtain appropriate protection if he were restricted to specific 
varieties for two reasons: first, the development of specific varieties will often not be in 
his field of activity and, second, he would always be limited to a few varieties even 
though he had provided the means for inserting the gene into all appropriate plants.’155  
 
If EPC patent protection could not be obtained for any category of plants, the only 
possible protection would be afforded for plant varieties by the UPOV Convention. 
These reflections contribute to the rest of the argumentation presented by the Enlarged 
Board of Appeal. To interpret Article 53 (b) EPC as excluding all categories of plants 
would create an insufficient opportunity for inventors to protect their products. It would 
also leave subject matter with no possible intellectual property protection. Categories of 
plants on taxonomical levels superordinate to variety would not be protectable by either 
plant breeder’s rights or patent. The Enlarged Board of Appeal did not find that such a 
situation was intended.156 After considering the above mentioned arguments, the 
Enlarged Board of Appeal came to the conclusion that a claim wherein specific plant 
varieties are not individually claimed is not excluded from patentability under Article 53 
(b) EPC, even though it may embrace plant varieties.157 
 
Consequently, they agreed with the thought of the so called ‘more than a single variety’ 
approach which requires that patents encompassing plant varieties not individually 
claimed may be granted. This conclusion stands in contrast to the findings in the Plant 
Genetic Systems case and the Novartis I case. However, the decision in the Novartis II 
case is delivered by the Enlarged Board of Appeal which is the last instance of appeal in 
                                                     
155 G 1/98 point 3.8 of the Reasons. 
156 G 1/98 point 3.7 of the Reasons. 
157 G 1/98 point 2 of the Conclusion. 
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the EPO system. Furthermore, the Novartis II decision is the latest case considering this 
point of law. This entails that the decision expresses the current legal understanding of 
Article 53 (b) EPC.  
 
4.2.8 Consequences  
 
The consequence of the Novartis II ruling is that the organs that are given the 
competence to interpret EPC, the Technical Board of Appeal and the Enlarged Board of 
Appeal, have chosen an approach which emphasises the relation between the patent 
system and plant breeder’s rights at the expense of an understanding of Article 53 (b) 
EPC that excludes plants and animals from patentability on a broad scale. A method of 
restricting patents for such subject matter is to interpret the variety exception to include 
categories of plants and animals of all taxonomical ranks. The Enlarged Board of 
Appeal in the Novartis II case, on the other hand, argued that the term plant variety 
should be interpreted narrowly to include only the taxonomical rank of variety, allowing 
superordinate ranks to be patentable. Therefore, the gap in the intellectual property 
protection of plants is avoided. As explained above, if the variety exception is 
understood to include plants on all taxonomical levels, there will be subject matter with 
no protection available.158 The taxonomical rank variety can be protected by plant 
breeder’s rights while categories of plants on superordinate taxonomical levels have no 
alternative protection to the patent system. This is avoided when applying the approach 
chosen by the Enlarged Board of Appeal in the Novartis II decision. The implications of 
this approach to interpreting Article 53 (b) EPC may be that patent protection is 
                                                     
158 See the Novartis II discussion. 
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afforded a wider range of plant subject matter than with the more restrictive approach, 
thus contributing to wider patent claims.  
 
The relationship between patents and plant breeder’s rights does not concern the 
understanding of the term animal variety. Inventors cannot obtain intellectual property 
protection for animals through plant breeder’s rights. Nevertheless, the Technical Board 
of Appeal in the Onco-mouse case came to the conclusion that the variety exception 
does not comprise taxonomical levels superordinate to animal variety.159 They came to 
the same conclusion as the Enlarged Board of Appeal later did in the Novartis II case. 
Since they could not base their argumentation on EPC’s relationship to UPOV, they 
applied a different reason for the conclusion. In particular, the Technical Board of 
Appeal in the Onco-mouse case argued that the exceptions relation to the main rule was 
an important reason for a narrow interpretation of the variety exception.160 
 
 As pointed out in the examination of the Onco-mouse case above, the Technical Board 
of Appeal argued that the term animal variety has to be defined according to the 
interface between the interests of the inventor and the interests of society.161 When it is 
determined that the term animal variety does not include animals as such, and there is 
no alternative intellectual protection for animal varieties it is, in my opinion, unclear 
what particular interest society has in excluding animal variety from patentability. It 
will be interesting to follow the future case law from EPO on this point of law.  
 
                                                     
159 See T 19/90. 
160 See T 19/90. 
161 See Chapter 4.2.3 and T 19/90 point 4.7 of the Reasons. 
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Even though the Boards of Appeal applied divergent reasons for their decisions, they 
came to the same conclusion both for plants and animals. The use of different 
argumentation may indicate that the objectives for exempting plant variety and animal 
variety are not identical. The object(s) and purpose(s) of the variety exceptions are 
assessed in Chapter 4.2.9. At this point in the presentation it is sufficient to note that 
there is a difference in the possibilities for attaining intellectual property protection for 
plants and animals. Moreover, factual differences in the biological composition of 
plants and animals may possibly affect the need for intellectual property protection.162 
 
Since the reasoning and factual situation differs for plants and animals, the variety 
exception may possibly be interpreted differently for plants and animals in the future. 
This might be the case, for instance, if the withdrawal of the dual protection ban in 
UPOV-91 affects the interpretation of the term plant variety in EPC.163 This is discussed 
in detail below. 164  For the purpose of this discussion, it is sufficient to point out that 
even though references to the UPOV-91 Convention have been made, EPC case law has 
not yet taken the revocation into consideration.165 UPOV-91 did not enter into force 
until 24 April 1998. None of the examined case law has been based on patent 
applications submitted prior to that date. Consequently, according to public international 
                                                     
162 For a further presentation see Chapter 1.4. 
163 The dual protection ban implicates that the same subject matter can not be protected by both 
patent and plant breeder’s rights. In UPOV-61 and -78 there is a ban against such dual 
protection. The ban was not continued in UPOV-91. For a further presentation on this point of 
law see Chapter 5. 
164 The impact of the abolishment of the dual protection ban for EPC and the Directive is 
discussed in Chapter 5.6.  
165 It is referred to the UPOV-91 Convention in for example G 3/95 point 3 (2) of the Reasons. 
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law it is methodologically correct for the Boards of Appeal to keep to the older versions 
of the UPOV Convention.166 Thus, they have not had any occasion to assess the 
consequences of the removal of the dual protection ban. For future cases to be tried 
before the Boards of Appeal, however, there are at least three alternative approaches to 
how the withdrawal of the UPOV dual protection ban may affect the interpretation of 
Article 53 (b) EPC. First, the Boards of Appeal may come to the conclusion that the 
UPOV-91 Convention does not affect the interpretation of EPC at all. In that case, the 
Boards of Appeal can uphold the current legal situation by resting on other legal 
arguments that lead to the same conclusion. For example, they may use the 
argumentation applied for animals in the Onco-mouse case. There they have pointed out 
that a narrow interpretation of Article 53 (b) EPC derives from the relationship between 
the exception and the main rule in Article 52 (1) EPC. 167  Moreover, the Boards of 
Appeal may argue that plant breeder’s rights are more suitable for protection of plant 
varieties than patent, and therefore leave the protection of such subject matter to UPOV 
without seeing the abolishment of dual protection as a decisive legal argument. Second, 
that EPC is not affected by the changes in UPOV until all contracting parties of EPC 
have become affiliated to UPOV-91. This can, as the discussion in Chapter 5.2 
indicates, be the result of an interpretation of Article 31, third paragraph, litra c of the 
Vienna Convention. Third, that the Boards of Appeal consider the changes in UPOV as 
making the variety exception in Article 53 (b) EPC obsolete and unnecessary. Plant 
varieties were excluded from European patent protection mainly because several of the 
signatory States to the European Patent Convention had developed special protection for 
plant breeding at national and international level and because UPOV prohibited double 
                                                     
166 As a main rule, a treaty does not apply until it enters into force. This can be deduced from 
Article 18 (b) of the Vienna Convention. 
167 See Chapter 4.2.3.  
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protection.168 Thus, the Boards of Appeal could argue that it would be unreasonable to 
uphold an exclusion in EPC when double protection is not forbidden in UPOV. It may 
be methodologically difficult for the Boards of Appeal to disregard the wording of the 
variety exception, but they may at least send a signal to the competent body that 
amendments are necessary.  It is impossible to say with certainty what alternative the 
Boards of Appeal will choose. This concludes the discussion of EPO case law. In the 
following chapter the subsequent administrative rules based on the reviewed case law 
are assessed. 
 
4.2.9 Object and purpose of EPC and the Directive  
 
The relevance of a treaty’s object and purpose as a source of law is established in 
Article 31, first paragraph of the Vienna Convention. A teleological interpretation is 
also according to EC law a means of interpretation.169 This means that for EPC and the 
Directive a teleological interpretation is relevant for the understanding of the terms 
plant and animal variety. The question in this chapter is how the terms plant and animal 
variety of EPC and the Directive are affected by their object and purpose.  
 
In a historical perspective, the exception of plant and animal subject matter originates 
from the conclusion of the Strasbourg Patent Convention, the predecessor of EPC, in 
1963. Article 2 of the Strasbourg Patent Convention states that plant and animal 
varieties were not patentable. Just a few years earlier, in 1961, the UPOV Convention 
was signed by most of the European states which later entered into the Strasbourg 
                                                     
168 See T 49/83 point 4 of the Reasons. 
169 Ellis and Tridimas 1995 p. 563. 
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Patent Convention. UPOV-61 emphasised that dual protection, that is intellectual 
property protection by both plant variety protection and patent law for one particular 
product, was banned.170 The parties of the Strasbourg Patent Convention therefore 
excluded plant varieties from patentability. The object and purpose of the variety 
exception in EPC and the Directive is to exclude subject matter which is eligible for 
protection under UPOV. 171 This means that the reason for exempting plant subject 
matter is a division of labour between the patent law and plant variety protection. The 
object and purpose therefore indicates that the plant variety exception is to be 
interpreted in a manner that excludes subject matter eligible for protection under UPOV, 
while other categories of plants are not encompassed by the variety exception. This 
interpretation is in line with the understanding presented in EPO case law, EPC 
Implementing Regulation and the EC Directive.172  
 
The objective presented above does not cover the exclusion of animal variety. There is 
no alternative intellectual property protection for animal varieties. The reason for 
exempting animal varieties from patentability is therefore not clear.173 The uncertainty 
entails that, based on a teleological interpretation of the animal variety, the 
understanding of the term is unclear.  
                                                     
170 Article 2 (1) UPOV-61.  
171 Paterson 1992 p. 336 and Grubb 1999 p. 252. 
172 See Chapters 4.2.8, 4.2.10 and 4.2.11.  
173 Paterson 1992 p. 338.  
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4.2.10 EPO Administrative regulation 
 
The question of the variety exceptions’ scope in relation to superordinate taxonomical 
levels is addressed in EPC Implementing Regulations Rule 23c (b). The rule was passed 
administratively in 2001. The Implementing Regulations are an integrated part of the 
Convention, and must therefore be taken into account.174 However, the Implementing 
Regulations are subsidiary sources of European patent law, and in case of conflict the 
Articles in the main EPC document prevail.175 The provision is formulated as follows: 
 
 ‘Biotechnological inventions shall also be patentable if they concern: 
plants or animals if the technical feasibility of the invention is not confined to a 
particular plant or animal variety;….’ 
 
The ordinary meaning of this is that the variety exception in EPC is delimited towards 
claims which comprise more than one variety, or in other words to claims which 
identify subject matter that is superordinate to the term variety. This can be seen as a 
clarification of the delimitation of Article 53 (b) EPC, and is in line with the ‘more than 
a single variety’ approach presented in the Novartis II decision.176 This points in the 
direction of excluding only one taxonomical unit from patentability, namely varieties.  
 
                                                     
174 Article 164 (1) EPC. See also Paterson 1992 p. 5. 
175 See Article 164 (2) EPC and Paterson 1992 p. 5. 
176 G 1/98 point 2 of the Conclusion. 
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4.2.11 The understanding of the EC Directive and the interaction with EPC 
 
In Chapter 4.1 the wording of the EC variety exception was interpreted. Subsequent to 
that examination the thesis addresses how EPO case law and administrative regulations 
affect the understanding of the EPC variety exception. Here, an assessment of how other 
sources of law than the wording of the Directive influence the interpretation of the EC 
variety exception is given. The understanding of the Directive can be important for two 
reasons. First, because the interpretation is crucial for the understanding of EC law 
itself. And second, due to the Directive’s impact on the understanding of EPC. Before 
looking into the interpretation of the Directive regarding the terms plant and animal 
variety in relation to superordinate taxonomical ranks, its role as a supplementary means 
of interpretation to EPC is discussed.  
 
Rule 23b (1) of the EPC Implementing Regulations states that: 
 
‘…. Directive 98/44/EC of 6 July 1998 on the legal protection of biotechnological 
inventions shall be used as a supplementary means of interpretation.’177 
 
This entails that the Patent Directive is to be taken into account as a supplementary 
means of interpretation to EPC. According to Article 32 of the Vienna Convention, 
supplementary means of interpretation are to be applied when the interpretation of other 
sources of law are inadequate for concluding on the particular point of law, or if the 
interpretation based on the principal means of interpretation leads to unreasonable or 
                                                     
177 Implementing Regulation to the Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Rule 23b (1), 
second sentence. 
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absurd results.178 The interpretation of EPC sources results, however, in a relatively 
clear understanding of the variety exception in relation to superordinate taxonomical 
ranks.179 Nevertheless, the Directive can still be a source of law because supplementary 
means of interpretation are, according to the International Law Commission, to be 
viewed in conjunction with other sources of law as a whole.180 The question is what is to 
be taken into account when interpreting EPC, the EC understanding of plant and animal 
variety at the point when Rule 23b (1) was established or the at all times prevailing EC 
interpretation of the terms. This is therefore a question of how dynamical EPC can be 
interpreted in relation to the EC Directive. One statement in the Official Journal of EPO 
from August and September 1999 exemplifies the ambiguousness of the situation. It is 
stated that: 
 
‘Rule 23b (4) adopts the definition of the concept of “plant variety” from Article 5 (2) 
of Regulation (EC) No. 2100/94 on plant variety rights, which is binding in accordance 
with Article 2 (3) of the Directive.’181 
 
This statement indicates that the EC Patent Directive is relevant to the understanding of 
EPC. The meaning of the word adopts is, however, unclear. The word does not give a 
                                                     
178 Article 32 of the Vienna Convention. 
179 See Chapters 4.2.8, 4.2.9 and 4.2.10. 
180 Brownlie 1998 p. 633.  
181 See the EPO Official Journal: OJ EPO 8-9/1999, p. 579, point 18. According to the Vienna 
Convention Article 31, 2 (b), instruments made by the contracting parties are seen as relevant 
means of interpretation. EPO is the executive body of EPC established to implement the content 
of the convention. Consequently, it may be seen as such an instrument. Hence, the Official 
Journal issued by EPO may have relevance as a means of interpretation of the EPC. 
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clear indication of on which basis the supplementary means of interpretation can be 
used in the understanding of EPC. It can either be on the basis of the understanding of 
the Directive as it was when it was decided that the Patent Directive was to be a 
supplementary means of interpretation, or on the basis of the at all times present 
understanding of the Directive. Here, the interest of sovereignty of state has to be 
balanced towards the interests of effectiveness and dynamics. The balance between 
these considerations determines the states’ ability to control the content of their 
international obligations. The question is therefore how the interests are to be balanced. 
An objective for EPO is harmonisation of European patent law. This is stated in the 
Preamble of EPC.182 The same consideration is, as a general principle, put forward by 
the European Community in the Rome treaty.183 This indicates that the EPC may be 
interpreted dynamically to contribute to the harmonisation. On the other hand, the EPC 
member states’ sovereignty may limit the degree of dynamical interpretation even 
though this can lead to a less efficient interpretation in relation to harmonisation. This 
indicates a restrictive application of the Directive as a supplementary means of 
interpretation to EPC. Exactly how these considerations are balanced is not easy to 
determine.  
 
EPO has decided to give the EC Directive status as a supplementary means of 
interpretation. This indicates that EPO and its member states are willing to take the risk 
that the understanding of the Directive develops in a direction of which EPO is 
uncomfortable with since such understanding can contribute to an interpretation of EPC 
which is unwanted by EPO and it members. Furthermore, since both EPO and the EC 
are eager to harmonise European patent law, the possibility of deviating interpretation is 
                                                     
182 Recital 1 of the EPC Preamble. 
183 Recital 5 of the preamble of the Rome treaty.  
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limited. Moreover, it has to be taken into consideration that EC Directive would be one 
of several sources of law being assessed. This means that the impact of a supplementary 
means of interpretation is limited. These features indicates that the at all times present 
understanding of the EC Directive can be taken into consideration as a supplementary 
means of interpretation when interpreting EPC.  
 
This means that the EC Directive is relevant as a supplementary means of interpretation 
for EPC and that the at all times present understanding of the Directive is to form the 
basis for the interpretation. How EPO assesses this question is, however, determined 
through future practice by the Technical Board of Appeal and the Enlarged Board of 
Appeal.  
 
This concludes the discussion on how the Directive is to be assessed in relation to the 
interpretation of EPC. In the following, the focus turns towards discussing the 
interpretation of the EC Directive. In the previous chapter, the question was how the 
EPC terms plant and animal variety are delimited towards categories of plants and 
animals on superordinate taxonomical levels. This topic is also addressed in the EC 
Directive: 
 
‘Inventions which concern plants or animals shall be patentable if the technical 
feasibility of the invention is not confined to a particular plant or animal variety.’184 
 
Article 4 second paragraph is substantially identical to the provision in the 
Implementing Regulations of EPC. The ordinary meaning of this provision is, as in 
EPC, that while variety is excluded from patentability, claims which identify subject 
                                                     
184 Article 4 second paragraph of the EC Directive. 
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matter that is superordinate to the term variety is patentable. This suggests that in the 
European Community also, the reason for the variety exception is to delimit the patent 
systems from the plant breeder’s rights systems, and not to prevent overly wide patent 
scopes. 
 
The preamble of the Directive, recital 31, is a means of interpretation and can indicate 
how the variety exception is to be understood:185  
 
‘Whereas a plant grouping which is characterised by a particular gene (and not its whole 
genome) is not covered by the protection of new varieties and is therefore not excluded 
from patentability even if it comprises new varieties of plants;’186 
 
The statement indicates that categories of plants of superordinate taxonomical rank are 
patentable, while only inventions delimited to one particular plant variety is excluded 
from patentability. This is in line with the EPO understanding of the term plant variety 
presented in the Novartis II decision.187 The statement does not, however, consider the 
situation for animal varieties. This may indicate that the exceptions for plant and animal 
varieties shall be interpreted differently. However, seen in conjunction with the wording 
of Article 4, second paragraph, discussed in the previous paragraph, the Directive opens 
for patentability of inventions expressing subject matter on taxonomical levels 
superordinate to both plant and animal variety. This has, as discussed above, 
consequences also for the interpretation of EPC. The interpretation of the Directive 
                                                     
185 The preamble is a relevant source of law according to the Vienna Convention Article 31 first 
paragraph, cf. second paragraph. 
186  Recital 31 of the preamble of the Patent Directive. 
187 G 1/98 point 2 of the Conclusion.  
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supports and strengthens the results of other EPC sources of law. Thus, this is an 
example of the interaction between EPC and the Directive.  
 
4.2.12 The impact of the Community Plant Variety Rights Regulation on the 
Directive and EPC 
 
The Community Plant Variety Rights Regulation regulates the protection of new plant 
varieties within the EC.188 The question in this chapter is to what extent the 
understanding of plant variety in the Regulation affects the interpretation of the term 
first of all in the Directive, but also indirectly the impact on EPC through the application 
of the Directive as a supplementary means of interpretation. First, the Regulation’s 
potential impact on the Directive is examined. 
 
The point of departure is that the intention of the EC secondary legislation is, among 
other, to harmonise, in fully or partially, the national legislation of the member states.189 
Thus, it would be unfortunate if the secondary legislation is reciprocally divergent. This 
may lead to problems in the practice of the EC law at the national level. Furthermore, 
the use of coherence considerations in EC law indicates that the Patent Directive is to be 
interpreted in the light of the Plant Variety Regulation.190 This means that the 
Regulation is generally relevant in the interpretation of the Directive. However, it has to 
be noted that generally there is no automatic connection between the interpretation of a 
term in one document and a similar term in another. For instance, different object and 
                                                     
188 EC Regulation NO2100/94. 
189 Recital 5 of the preamble of the Rome treaty. 
190 Arnesen 1992 pp. 27-29. 
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purpose may lead to diverging understandings. In this case, however, it is referred from 
the Directive to the Regulation for the definition of plant variety.191 On the one hand, 
this can indicate that the Directive is interpreted in accordance with the Regulation on 
this point of law. On the other hand, the reference can also mean that only the wording 
of the definition in the Regulation, and not the interpretation of the provision as a 
whole, is to be taken into account when interpreting the term in the Directive. In Article 
5 of the Regulation this statement is made: 
 
‘For the purpose of this Regulation, “variety” shall be taken to mean a plant grouping 
within a single botanical taxon of the lowest known rank, which grouping, irrespective 
of whether the conditions for the grant of a plant variety right are fully met, can be: 
defined by the expression of the characteristics that results from a given genotype or 
combination of genotypes, 
distinguished from any  other plant grouping by the expression of at least one of the said 
characteristics, and 
considered as a unit with regard to its suitability for being propagated unchanged.’192 
 
The wording of this definition is substantially identical to the definition of plant variety 
in both the EPC Implementing Regulation and the UPOV-91 Convention.193 The 
objective of the Regulation is to harmonise the plant variety protection in EC member 
states.194 Taking into account that the EC members are also members of UPOV, it is 
natural that the UPOV understanding of plant variety is similar to the understanding of 
                                                     
191 Article 2, third paragraph of the Directive, cf. Article 5 of the Regulation. 
192 Article 5 of the Regulation.  
193 Rule 23b (4) of the EPC Implementing Regulation and Article 1 (vi) UPOV-91.  
194 Recital 2 of the preamble of the Regulation.  
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the term in the Regulation and thus also in the Directive. The conclusion is therefore 
that Regulation affects the understanding of the term plant variety in the Directive, but 
that the understanding of the Regulation on this point of law is founded on the UPOV 
understanding. Therefore, the effect of Regulation is in practice limited. 
 
The next question is if also the term plant variety used in EPC is affected by the 
understanding of the term in the Regulation. The EPC Implementing Regulations Rule 
23b (1) states that the Directive has status as a supplementary means of interpretation to 
the EPC. Since the Directive refers to the definition of plant variety in the Regulation, 
and the Directive is to be interpreted in the light of this definition, the Regulation is, as 
discussed in the previous paragraph, de facto relevant for the interpretation of the term 
in the Directive. And because the Directive is relevant for the interpretation of EPC, the 
Regulation is indirectly relevant to the understanding of EPC. The understanding of 
plant variety in the Regulation is as seen in the previous paragraph based on the UPOV-
91 definition. The practical impact of the Regulation is therefore limited since EPC is, 
as discussed in Chapter 5, affected by the UPOV definition of plant variety. 
 
4.2.13 EPC as a source of law when interpreting the EC Patent Directive 
 
All the members of EC are also parties to EPC, but the European Community as such is 
not a party to EPC.195 International obligations only become a part of EC law when the 
Community as such has taken on the obligations.196 This means that EPC is not an 
integral part of EC law. This indicates that EPC cannot affect the understanding of the 
                                                     
195 See www.european-patent-office.org/epo/members.htm. Accessed on 10 November 2003.  
196 Bourgeois 2000 p. 92.  
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Patent Directive. However, the European Court of Justice sometimes takes international 
law into account as an auxiliary source of law when interpreting EC law.197 There is not 
yet any practice from the European Court of Justice addressing the question of EPC as a 
means of interpretation for understanding the Patent Directive. However, the objective 
of the Directive is to harmonise the legal situation in the EC member states on the issue 
of patentability of plants and animals.198 The national patent legislation in the EC 
member states are to a great extent based on EPC also on the question of patentability of 
plants and animals.199 This connection on the national level means that the states are 
given frames within which the national patent law is passed and practiced. The states 
have to take into consideration both EPC and the Directive. Thus the close connection 
between EPC and the Directive with regard to harmonisation of patent law on 
biotechnology indicates that EPC can play a role in the interpretation of the Directive. 
The question of applying EPC in the understanding of the Directive is not clarified. 
However, based on the connection between presented above, the thesis has as a premise 
that EPC can be used in the interpretation of the Directive.  
 
There is not yet any case law from the European Court of Justice determining how the 
EPC understanding of plant and animal variety can affect the interpretation of plant and 
animal variety in the Directive. The effect of this methodological situation is not clear. 
However, the situation indicates that if the EPC understanding changes, the 
                                                     
197 See for example C-10/61 Commission v. Italy, (1962) ECR 1. See also Kapteyn and Themaat 
1998 p. 280.  
198 Recital 9 of the preamble of the Directive.  
199 Paterson 1992 p. 37. Here the understanding of UK patent law in relation to EPC is given as 
an example.  
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understanding in the Directive may be affected by the potential change. This is yet an 
example of how EPC and the Directive are likely to be influenced by each other.  
 
4.2.14 Patent practice as a source of law 
 
In this chapter the question is whether patent practice from the first instance of EPO is 
to be regarded as a source of law. This is of importance for the examinations of the legal 
situation de lege lata in the discussions presented in this thesis. The practice is formed 
through the grant and refusal of patent applications directed to EPO.  
 
There are two alternative approaches to the question of the position of first instance 
patent practice as a source of law. Either patent practice expresses the current legal 
situation and is therefore a source of law, or it can be seen merely as practice of de lege 
lata as e.g. a patent examiner or an Opposition Division sees it and thus not a source of 
law. On the one hand, there are a vast number of patent applications, granted and 
refused, which can give an indication of how the EPC is to be understood. This 
indicates that practice should be assessed as a source of law. On the other hand, there 
are numerous patent examiners and Opposition Divisions. It can therefore be difficult 
for such a large number of people to have an overview of earlier practice and coordinate 
with concurrent practice. This complexity indicates that the practice of first instance 
should not be seen as a source of law. The conclusion to the question of the position of 
first instance practice as a means of interpretation cannot be said to be clear. However, 
since it is difficult to find a representative collection of first instance practice, such 
practice is not examined in this thesis. This conclusion applies to the discussion in 
Chapter 4.2 as well as Chapter 4.3. 
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4.2.15 Conclusion 
 
The main question at hand has been whether the terms plant and animal variety applied 
in Article 53 (b) EPC and Article 4 first paragraph in the EC Patent Directive are to 
include categories of plants and animals of superordinate taxonomical rank, or if they 
are limited to one taxonomical level, namely the variety level. The ordinary meaning of 
the wording of the provisions suggested that the legal scope was delimited to the variety 
level. The EPO case law was to some extent staggering. However, the latest decision, 
Novartis II, indicates that the understanding of plant variety does not include categories 
of plants of superordinate taxonomical levels. For animal varieties, the same is 
suggested in the Onco-mouse decision. An interpretation of provisions and recitals in 
the EPC Implementing Regulations and the Directive points in the same direction. Also 
the object and purpose of the exception suggests that it is confined to the rank variety. 
An examination of the sources of law leads to the conclusion that the terms plant variety 
and animal variety, as applied in the European Patent Organisation and the European 
Community, do not comprise categories of plants and animals of superordinate 
taxonomical ranks, but are confined to the variety level.  
 
4.3 Subordinate biological levels 
 
In the previous chapter the term variety was examined in relation to categories of plants 
and animals of superordinate taxonomical ranks. In this chapter the question of 
patentability of expressions of plants and animals on levels subordinate to variety are 
examined. The examination assesses patentability of individual specimens of plants and 
animals and microbiological expressions such as cells, proteins, vectors, and genes. It 
can be asked whether granting patents for individual specimens and microbiological 
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levels of plants and animals in fact constitutes protection of a variety. In the following 
chapters these scopes are therefore discussed in order to determine the limits of the 
variety exception in EPC and the Directive.  
 
As pointed out in the introduction, this thesis aims to contribute to the understanding of 
the term variety. It is therefore necessary to delimit the term towards adjacent 
expressions of plants and animals. As the pointed out above in Chapter 1.4, the 
taxonomical system is hierarchic.200 This can also be said to be the case for the 
biological levels subordinate to variety. The structure relevant for patent applications is, 
in descending hierarchic order, individual specimen, cells, proteins, vectors and genes. 
The inventive step of an invention can be on any of these levels. In the following 
chapter the questions related to individual specimens are examined. 
 
4.3.1 Plant and animal specimens in relation to plant and animal variety 
 
In this chapter the question is whether patent claims regarding specimens of plants and 
animals is interpreted as encompassed by the plant and animal variety exception in EPC 
and the Directive. In this context specimen can be understood as one particular plant or 
animal individual. The answers to the questions discussed in this chapter are not 
clarified in either EC law or in EPO. Hence, the assessments presented here can only be 
seen an indication of a possible approach to patentability of specimens related to the 
variety exception. The presentation is based on relevant sources of law. 
 
                                                     
200 Mayr 1982 p. 205. 
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The fulfilment of the patent requirements, especially reproduction, novelty and 
inventive step, may be problematic in relation to plant and animal specimens. This 
thesis is delimited towards the patent requirements. The questions in this thesis are 
related to the eligibility of different types of subject matter in relation to the variety 
exception. This delimitation is, of course, also applied in this chapter. Therefore, as in 
the rest of this thesis, the patent requirements invention, novelty, inventive step and 
industrial application are not discussed.  
 
 As pointed out above, the question is whether or not it is possible to limit the patent 
claims regarding a specimen so that a variety is not encompassed. Or more precisely, 
whether it is possible to limit the patent claims to the traits which are exclusive to that 
specimen and not typical for a group, a variety. To limit the patent claims to one 
specimen, it is necessary to describe the characteristics which appear in that particular 
specimen, but which are not present in other specimens. By comparing the genetic 
constellation of the specimen described in the patent claim with other specimens, this 
may be possible. This suggests that it might be possible that a specimen is patentable 
without conflicting with the variety exception.  
 
A problem occurs, however, in relation to the limits of such a claim. Therefore, the next 
question is to what extent the patent claim encompasses not only one particular 
specimen, but also other specimens for example its offspring. This can be divided into 
two questions. First, whether it is possible for the characteristics of the specimen 
specified in the claims to remain intact in that particular combination when passed on to 
other specimens. Second, how that situation would relate to the variety exception. Using 
sexual propagation as means of reproduction, the offspring will at least have some 
characteristics diverging from the patented parent since such propagation requires 
reproductive cells from two specimens. It is thus possible that such offspring may not be 
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comprised by the claim. Cloning techniques, techniques used to produce clones, might 
present another situation. A clone is ‘a group of cells, an organism, or a population of 
organisms arising from a single ancestral cell. All members of a particular clone are 
genetically identical.’201 This means that a clone may be covered by the claim 
characterising the traits of the original specimen.  
 
The second question is, as indicated above, how such a claim relates to the variety 
exception. In the plant variety definition of the Directive and EPC it is stated that a 
variety is ‘a plant grouping’ with certain common characteristics.202 Even though the 
patent claims are delimited towards plant variety concerning the original specimen, the 
clones may fulfil the requirements for plant variety because they can be seen as a group, 
not as a specimen. This indicates that at some point the clones derived from the original 
specimen may be considered to be a plant variety and may thus not be patentable. There 
is no definition of animal variety in either EPC or the Patent Directive. It is therefore 
difficult to see animal clones in relation to the variety exception.  
                                                     
201 Martin and Hine 2000 p. 128. Cloning can occur naturally, by means of traditional techniques 
(e.g. cutting) and by advanced gene-technology. 
202 See Article 2, third paragraph of the Patent Directive cf. Article 5, second paragraph of the 
Regulation, Rule 23b forth paragraph of the EPC Implementing Regulation. 
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4.3.2 The demarcation between cells and plant and animal variety  
 
Point of departure –the wording of the variety exception in EPC and the Directive 
The question in this chapter is whether plant and animal cells in some cases are 
comprised by the term plant or animal variety. 203  The patentability of plant and animal 
cells in relation to the variety exception is not explicitly mentioned in the provisions of 
EPC and the Directive. This could either imply that it is evident that plant and animal 
cells are considered to be comprised by the terms plant or animal variety or, on the 
contrary, that such subject matter is patentable. Hence, the wording does not give any 
clear indication of how the posed question should be answered. However, taking into 
consideration that the point of departure in patent law is that exceptions from 
patentability have to be explicitly formulated, the silence regarding cells indicates that 
plant and animal cells are not comprised by the variety exception. 
 
Other EPO sources  
The question of patentability of plant cells has been discussed in EPO case law. The 
Plant Genetic Systems case states:  
 
‘Plant cells as such…cannot be considered to fall under the definition of a plant or a 
plant variety.’204 
 
                                                     
203 Cell: ‘The structural and functional unit of most living organisms. …. Each cell contains a 
mass of protein material…which contains DNA.’. Martin and Hine 2000 p. 103. 
204 T 356/93 point 23 of the Reasons. 
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This means that as long as the claims in the patent application are limited to comprising 
one or more plant cells, and do not make a plant variety the scope of the claim, the 
patent will not be affected by the variety exception. The tenet was put into practice in 
relation to the application’s Claim 14. The appellant stated that Claim 14, a claim 
covering plant cells, should be regarded not to be patentable because the claim de facto 
encompassed a plant variety. The Technical Board of Appeal did not agree: 
 
‘…the Board cannot agree with the Appellants’ submission that this claim covers de 
facto plant varieties and that,…,it is not allowable under Article 53 (b) EPC, 
because,…,plant cells as such may not be considered to fall under the definition of a 
plant or a plant variety.’205 
 
The Technical Board of Appeal consequently came to the conclusion that the subject 
matter of the claim did not represent an exception from patentability under Article 53 
(b) EPC.  
 
The Technical Board of Appeal does not explicitly explain the reasoning for the 
statement. One possible reason is, in my opinion, that the Technical Board of Appeal 
considered the object and purpose of the variety exception for plants. As examined in 
Chapter 4.2.9, the reason for excluding plant varieties was to avoid granting double 
protection for identical subject matter under both the patent systems and the UPOV 
Convention. Plant cells as such are not eligible for protection under the UPOV 
Convention.206 Since dual protection will not occur, it is not necessary to exclude such 
subject matter. When the main rule of patentability states that all subject matter which is 
                                                     
205 T 356/93 point 40.2 of the Reasons. 
206 See Article 1 (vi) of UPOV-91. 
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not explicitly excluded is patentable, claims confined to plant cells should be 
patentable.207 This understanding is in line with the approach taken by the Technical 
Board of Appeal when assessing the legal situation for taxonomical ranks superordinate 
to variety.208 The Technical Board of Appeal emphasised that the exception is limited to 
variety while expressions of plants and animals on superordinate taxonomical levels are 
patentable. Based on the legal sources of EPO, the conclusion is that plant cells are 
patentable when the claims are limited to cells and not a plant variety. 
 
Other EC sources    
The examination above assesses plant cells in relation to the variety exception in EPC. 
In this paragraph the focus turns towards the legal situation under the Directive. The 
introduction to this chapter points out that no provision in the Directive explicitly deals 
with the question at hand. However, there may be a provision which touches upon the 
patentability of plant cells in relation to the variety exception. Article 4, second 
paragraph of the Directive reads: 
 
‘Inventions which concern plants or animals shall be patentable if the technical 
feasibility of the invention is not confined to a particular plant or animal variety.’209 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4.1, the provision is as a point of departure concerned with the 
relationship between varieties and superordinte taxonomical levels. The question to be 
posed here is whether the provision can be said to include the relationship between plant 
cells and the variety exception. The provision states that ‘the invention is not confined 
                                                     
207 Article 52 (1) EPC. 
208 See for example G 1/98 assessed in Chapter 4.2.7. 
209 Article 4, second paragraph of the Directive. 
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to a particular plant or animal variety’. The ordinary meaning of the word confined is 
limited or restricted.210 It seems that this understanding implies that the variety 
exception does not comprise expressions which include more than one variety, while 
expressions on a level subordinate to variety are not discussed in this provision. This 
suggests that the provision is intended to concern only the relation between the variety 
exception and superordinate taxonomical levels. Article 4, second paragraph of the 
Directive is therefore not applicable with regards to the situation discussed in this 
paragraph.  
 
Perhaps the object and purpose of the Patent Directive can shed light on the legal 
situation at hand given the wording of the preamble: 
  
‘…effective and harmonised protection throughout the Member States is essential in 
order to maintain and encourage investments in the field of biotechnology.’211 
 
According to this recital, the main objective of the Directive is to harmonise the patent 
regulations within the European Community. Since all members of the EC are 
contracting parties to EPC, it is natural to be certain that the practice from EPO is 
implemented on the national level through the codifications of the European Patent 
Office practice in the EC Patent Directive. Taking this into account, it is possible that 
the patentability of cells in relation to the variety exception is to be understood 
according to the interpretation of the same question in EPC. This means that cells as 
such are patentable if the claims are limited to cells but not comprising a plant variety. 
However, the EC is not obligated to take on the interpretations of the EPO since these 
                                                     
210 Hornby 1974 p. 178. 
211 Recital 3 of the Preamble of the Directive. 
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are two autonomous legal systems. The legislator of the European Community bases its 
legislation on an independent assessment of how it wants to develop patent law within 
the EC. As pointed out, this does not prevent the EC legislator from being inspired by 
EPC and EPO practice. The question of patentability of cells in relation to the variety 
exception has seemingly not, as the examination above shows, been assessed by the EC 
legislator. However, it is possible that the EC, when they do take a stand in this 
question, will be inspired by the legal situation in EPO. Such an influence can 
contribute to the dynamics between the two patent systems: the EC through its objective 
of harmonising the legislation in member states, and the EPC because the Directive is a 
supplementary means of interpretation.212 This dynamic effect can lead to a situation 
where the two systems push each other in one direction. Nevertheless, there are 
limitations to this dynamic effect. Article 3, first paragraph 1, litra h of the Rome Treaty 
states the limit: 
 
‘For the purposes set out in Article 2, the activities of the Community shall include, as 
provided in this Treaty and in accordance with the timetable set out therein: 
the approximation of the laws of Member States to the extent required for the 
functioning of the common market;’213 
 
This indicates that it is possible that the EC attempts to harmonise national legislation 
within the Community only as long as the harmonisation promotes the functioning of 
                                                     
212 EC: Recital 5 of the preamble of the Rome treaty. EPO: Implementing Regulation to the 
Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Rule 23b (1), second sentence. 
213 Article 3, first paragraph, litra h of the Rome Treaty. 
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the common market.214 If the interpretations of EPC are in conflict with the promotion 
of the common market it may be that the Directive not be interpreted in accordance with 
EPC. In the continuation of this discussion, it has to be pointed out that the basic 
objectives of the EC can affect the interpretation, possibly creating divergence from the 
understanding of the legal situation in EPC. One of the most important objectives of the 
EC is to promote trade between the member states.215 This objective diverges from the 
object and purpose of the EPC. There, the object and purpose is confined to the classical 
intention of patent law, namely promoting invention in the best interest of both the 
inventor and society.216 Since the object and purpose of the EC are to be taken into 
consideration, they can effect the interpretation of the Directive. However, it can be said 
that the objectives of the two systems are not that dissimilar. Promoting trade and 
promoting inventions can be seen as two sides of the same argument both promoting the 
common market. This means that a conflict would not come into existence between the 
objectives. Consequently, for the EC legislators to be inspired by the interpretation of 
plant cells in relation to the variety exception would not be in conflict with the Rome 
Treaty.   
 
Therefore the question how patentability of plant cells is to be considered in relation to 
the variety exception in the Directive cannot be answered with certainty. However, 
based on the discussions above, it is likely that the question will be interpreted in 
accordance with the understanding set forth by EPO. Consequently, that plant cells are 
                                                     
214 See Kapteyn and Themaat 1998 p. 778 where it is pointed out that patent law is one example 
of a legal field which influences the functioning of the common market.  
215 See Article 2 of the Rome Treaty. 
216 Bently and Sherman 2001 p. 313. 
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not included in the variety exception and that the main rule in Article 3, first paragraph 
of the Directive prevails.  
 
Special circumstances affecting the interpretation of animal cells in relation to the 
variety exception  
In the previous paragraphs, plant cells where discussed. Here, the question is whether 
animal cells as such are patentable. The reason for exempting plant varieties from 
patentability is related to the protection of such subject matter under the UPOV 
Convention. For animal varieties, there is no such alternative protection. Consequently, 
the concern with dual protection for identical subject matter cannot give grounds for 
exempting animal varieties from patentability. 217  As the object and purpose of the 
plant variety exception and animal variety exception are divergent, the argumentation 
applied for plant cells cannot be fully implemented in the discussion of animal cells. A 
separate presentation is therefore needed.  
 
All subject matter which is not explicitly excluded from patentability is patentable. 
Consequently, if an animal cell is to be excluded from patentability the action has to be 
based on a legal authority. The wording of the variety exception in EPC and the 
Directive states that animal varieties are exempted from patentability. The ordinary 
meaning of this wording cannot be said to exempt animal cells. The wording has to be 
interpreted in accordance within its context. Therefore, it is relevant to consider the 
connection between the animal variety exception and the plant variety exception. The 
exception of plant varieties is based on the relationship between patent law and plant 
breeder’s rights; they are exempted from patentability to avoid double protection of 
identical subject matter under both the patent systems and the UPOV Convention. For 
                                                     
217 See Chapter 4.2.9 and 5. 
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animal varieties, there is no such alternative protection, and double protection is thus no 
problem. It seems as if the variety exception in both EPC and the Directive is based on 
the need for an operational interface between patent and plant breeder’s rights but not 
for animal varieties.218 As a point of departure, it can be said that a rule should be 
practiced in accordance with its object and purpose.219 Animal varieties are excluded 
from patentability even though there is no alternative protection available. The 
exception is therefore practiced without any clear object and purpose. It would therefore 
be questionable if animal cells were to be excluded from patentability in relation to the 
variety exception, when their plant counterparts were patentable. Thus, the conclusion 
is, in accordance with the main rule of patentability, that animal cells are patentable in 
relation to the variety exception.  
 
4.3.3 The delimitation between proteins and vectors and the term variety 
 
A protein can be defined as any of a large group of organic compounds found in all 
living organisms.220 In other words, proteins are the products of the genetic recipe in 
genes. Proteins are used by the organisms mainly to turn on or off a chemical reaction 
that controls a specific trait. A vector is a vehicle used in gene cloning to insert a foreign 
DNA fragment into the genome of a host cell. 221 The question is whether proteins and 
                                                     
218 Westerlund 2001 p. 388. 
219 See Article 31, first paragraph of the Vienna Convention. 
220 Martin and Hine 2000 p. 488. 
221 Martin and Hine 2000 p. 616. More on vectors: ‘The foreign DNA is spliced into the vector 
using specific restriction enzymes and DNA ligases to cleave the vector DNA and join the 
foreign DNA to the two ends created. In some phage vectors, part if the viral genome is 
enzymically removed and replaced with the foreign DNA. Retroviruses can be effective vectors 
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vectors are patentable in relation to the variety exception. This is relevant to this thesis 
because the inventive step of the inventions on both the protein and vector levels in 
some cases might be said to de facto comprise the variety level, even though the claims 
are formally limited to the protein and vector levels. The wording of the variety 
exception in EPC and the Directive state that plant and animal varieties are not 
patentable subject matter. The ordinary meaning of these terms cannot be said to include 
inventions on the protein and vector level. This indicates that such subject matter is 
patentable in relation to the variety exception.  
 
Cells and genes are in general patentable.222 This means that levels on either hierarchic 
boundary of proteins and vectors are patentable. Considering the relationship between 
the different levels of microbiological subject matter, it would serve the consistency of 
patentability if inventions on the protein and vector levels are patentable in relation to 
the variety exception.  
 
A limited number of available legal sources concern the patentability of proteins and 
vectors. Despite inquires, I have not found any practice from the EPO Technical Board 
of Appeal or the Enlarged Board of Appeal that discusses the patentability of subject 
matter on the protein and vector levels.223 On the one hand this can indicate that it may 
                                                                                                                                               
for introducing recombinant DNA into mammalian cells. In plants, derivatives of the tumour-
inducing plasmid of the crown gall bacterium,…, are used as vectors.’. Martin and Hine 2000 p. 
616. 
222 T 356/93 point 23 of the Reasons.  
223 The inquiries consist of searching for Technical- and Enlarged Board of Appeal cases where 
the patent claims are limited to the protein and vector levels in the EPO database on 
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be considered as obvious, and thus not contested by the appeal instance of EPO, that 
such subject matter is not patentable in relation to the variety exception. On the other 
hand it may indicate the opposite; that it is obvious that inventions are patentable on the 
protein and vector levels and that the question of such subject matter’s relation to the 
variety exception therefore has not been assessed by the Technical Board of Appeal or 
the Enlarged Board of Appeal. Based on the relation to the cell and gene levels and the 
ordinary understanding of the wording of the variety exception, the latter alternative 
seems plausible. On the basis of the sources of law examined in the discussion above, 
the conclusion is thus that inventions on the protein and vector levels are not comprised 
by the exception from patentability presented in the variety exceptions of EPC and the 
Directive.  
 
4.3.4 Genes in relation to plant and animal variety  
 
A gene is a unit of heredity composed of DNA.224 In general genes are patentable. 225 
This is for example stated in the preamble of the Directive: 
 
                                                                                                                                               
http://legal.european-patent-office.org/dg3/search_dg3.htm and http://www.european-patent-
office.org/dg3/g_dec/index.htm. Accessed on 10 November 2003.  
224 Martin and Hine 2000 p. 251. DNA: ‘The genetic material of most living organisms, which is 
a major constituent of the chromosomes within the cell nucleus and plays a central role in the 
determination of hereditary characteristics by controlling protein synthesis in cells.’ Martin and 
Hine 2000 p. 183. 
225 Article 52 (1) EPC, Article 3, first paragraph of the Directive and Recital 22 of the preamble 
of the Directive. 
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‘according to this Directive, the granting of a patent for such inventions which concern 
such sequences or partial sequences should be subject to the same criteria of 
patentability as in all other areas of technology: novelty, inventive step and industrial 
application;….’226  
 
The requirements for obtaining a patent are mentioned as criteria to grant patents for 
genes, while general exclusion of such subject matter is not emphasised. This can be 
interpreted to mean that genes shall not be excluded from patentability on a general 
basis, but be the subject of an assessment according to the ordinary patent requirements. 
What has been disputed, however, is whether naturally occurring genes can be 
patentable. This depends on how the requirement inventive step shall be assessed in 
relation to genes. According to EPO case law and the Directive genes have been 
considered patentable if isolated from their natural environment.227 The question 
presented above exceeds the scope of the thesis since the question does not relate to the 
variety exception and will therefore not be discussed further.  
 
Point of departure –the wording  
The question to be posed in this chapter is whether plant and animal genes, in one 
occasion, can be said to be comprised by the variety exception. In other words, whether 
or not a gene is patentable when the trait of the gene which is to be patented is what 
makes a plant or animal grouping different from other groups, thus creating a new plant 
or animal variety. According to the main rule in Article 52 (1) EPC and Article 3, first 
paragraph of the Directive, all subject matter which fulfils the patent requirements is 
                                                     
226 Recital 22 of the preamble of the Directive. 
227 See Howard Florey/Relaxin T 74/91 (1995) EPOR 541 and Article 3, paragraph 2 of the 
Directive.   
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patentable if not explicitly exempted. The patentability of genes in this relation is not 
discussed in neither the provisions of EPC nor the Directive. This implies that the main 
rule prevails and that genes whose traits entail the creation of a new plant or animal 
variety are patentable.  
 
The wording of the variety exception in both EPC and the Directive is that plant and 
animal varieties are not patentable.228 Even though the patentability of genes is not 
mentioned, the ordinary meaning of these provisions is that whatever is comprised by 
the terms plant and animal varieties are exempted from patentability. This indicates that 
genes, whose traits entail the creation of a new plant or animal variety, are encompassed 
by the terms and thus exempted from patentability. If such an interpretation is in 
accordance with the other sources of law is discussed below.  
 
In the following presentation, the legal situation for plant genes under the Directive are 
discussed before proceeding with plant genes under EPC and finally examining the legal 
situation for animal genes in both EPC and the Directive. The division is done due to 
the divergence in the legal sources other than the wording of the variety exception. 
 
Plant genes –the Directive  
In the preamble of the Directive the patentability of plant genes is mentioned. The 
variety exception in Article 4, first paragraph, litra a has to be interpreted in light of the 
preamble.229 Recital 31 states that: 
 
                                                     
228 Article 53 (b) EPC and Article 4, first paragraph, litra a of the EC Patent Directive. 
229 See Article 31, second paragraph of the Vienna Convention. 
  84 
 
‘Whereas a plant grouping which is characterised by a particular gene (and not its whole 
genome) is not covered by the protection of new varieties and is therefore not excluded 
from patentability even if it comprises new plant varieties.’230 
 
The recital at hand explicitly states that a group of plants which are divergent from other 
groups due to traits caused by a particular gene are patentable on one condition, despite 
the fact that the grouping encompasses plant varieties. The condition is that the scope of 
the patent claim is limited to the gene holding the particular traits and not the plant 
grouping’s entire genetic composition, the genome. The tie to the sui generis protection 
of plant varieties, for example as found in the UPOV Convention, is put forward in this 
recital. The statement can, in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the wording, be 
interpreted to mean that there is a close connection between patent protection in the 
Directive and the protection under the UPOV Convention: Because plant groupings 
characterised by one particular gene, and not the entire genome, cannot be protected by 
plant breeder’s rights, such subject matter is patentable in relation to the variety 
exception. As discussed in Chapter 4.2, that examines the variety exception’s relation to 
superordinate taxonomical levels, a strict understanding of the wording in Article 4, first 
paragraph, litra a of the Directive may suggest that the provision can be interpreted to 
mean that only plant varieties, and no other category of plants is to be exempted from 
patentability. The wording of Recital 31 is, as suggested above, based on the connection 
to the UPOV Convention. Under the UPOV Convention, protection is granted new plant 
varieties, while all other categories of plants fall outside the scope of the convention. 
Hence, the wording in this recital can indicate that the term plant variety has to be 
interpreted strictly in accordance with the wording of the Article 4, first paragraph, litra 
a of the Directive.  
                                                     
230 Recital 31 of the preamble of the Patent Directive. 
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 In this relation it is possible to draw a line to the object and purpose of the variety 
exception. In Chapter 4.2.9 the conclusion was that the object and purpose of the 
exception was to prevent double protection for identical subject matter. This indicates 
that the dual protection argument can be applied to the distinction between non-
patentable varieties and patentable genes. The interpretation of the wording presented 
above is therefore in accordance with the object and purpose of the variety exception. 
This suggests that a gene is patentable under the Directive if the claims are limited to 
that particular gene, and not the entire genome, even if the trait of the gene is what 
makes a plant grouping different from other groups, thus creating a new plant variety.  
 
Plant genes –EPC  
The discussion above has focused on the legal situation in the Directive. The question 
now is how Article 53 (b) EPC is to be interpreted. In the paragraph above, called point 
of departure –the wording, the variety exception is interpreted in light of its wording. 
Here, other sources of law are assessed. In the Onco-mouse case, the Technical Board 
of Appeal came to the conclusion that the variety exception should be interpreted 
narrowly in respect for the main rule in Article 52 (1) EPC. 231 Even though the Onco-
mouse case concerns superordinate taxonomical ranks and this discussion focuses on 
genes as one subordinate biological level, the argumentation of the Technical Board of 
Appeal can still be said to be of relevance because of the general nature of the 
statement. According to the methodology of public international law, wide 
interpretations of provisions are not the main rule in international law due to the 
principle of sovereignty of state.232 This means that since a state is only obligated to 
                                                     
231 T 19/90 point 4.5 of the Reasons. 
232 Brownlie 1998 p. 290.  
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adhere to commitments it has assumed, the state will typically be interested in 
interpreting these duties as narrowly and thus as near to the ordinary meaning of the 
wording as possible. Even though this does not give any concrete indication of how the 
term is to be understood in this situation, it may give some direction for the 
interpretation. This suggests that a wide interpretation of plant variety is not applied in 
the EPC understanding of the term.  
 
EPC has no recital in its preamble similar to Recital 31 of the Directive nor does it have 
any other provision concerned with this issue. This may indicate that plant genes are not 
patentable in relation to the variety exception. However, the relationship between EPC 
and the Directive has to be taken into account. In the Implementing Regulations to EPC 
it is stated that: 
 
 ‘Directive…shall be used as a supplementary means of interpretation.’233 
 
This implies that when the primary sources of law do not give a clear answer, or the 
results are ambiguous or obscure, the Directive is to be used as a supplementary means 
of interpretation in addition to those mentioned in Article 32 of the Vienna Convention. 
In this case, the question of patentability of genes in relation to the variety exception 
cannot be said to be clear. Therefore, the understanding of Recital 31 of the Directive’s 
preamble in the interpretation of the question at hand in EPC is relevant. For this 
discussion it is referred to the examination above. Consequently, this argument indicates 
that particular genes are patentable if the claims are limited to particular genes and not 
the entire genome. In addition to this argument, the object and purpose of the variety 
exception in EPC and the Directive are identical with regards to their relation to the 
                                                     
233 EPC Implementing Regulation, Rule 23b (1). 
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UPOV Convention. Therefore, it is also for this argumentation referred to the discussion 
above. Thus, the object and purpose indicates that a particular gene is patentable if the 
claims are limited to the gene and not the whole genome. The conclusion drawn from 
this discussion is that the variety exception in EPC is to be understood as allowing 
patents encompassing a particular gene which characterises a plant grouping, even if the 
trait creates a new plant variety. 
  
Animal genes under EPC and the Directive  
The discussions above have focused on the legal situation for plants. In this paragraph 
the question is whether an animal grouping distinguished from other groupings by a trait 
controlled by a particular gene is patentable in EPC and the Directive. For animal 
varieties there is no alternative intellectual property protection. The interface between 
the patent systems and a sui generis system cannot therefore, explain the exception for 
animal varieties. The argumentation applied above regarding the object and purpose of 
the variety exception related to plants cannot therefore, be used in this context. On the 
contrary, the fact that the variety exception for animals cannot be explained with a 
reference to a sui generis system may indicate that a gene which controls a trait 
distinguishing an animal grouping from other groupings is not to be patentable. Thus, 
that the variety exception is to be interpreted wider for animal varieties than for plant 
varieties. However, taking into account the legal history of the variety exception, it 
would have to be considered somewhat inconsistent that the variety exception for 
animals would be given a wider scope than the plant variety exception for which the 
exception was intended.234 At least for the interpretation of EPC the argument in relation 
to the principle of sovereignty of states can be used as an argument for allowing patents 
                                                     
234 Paterson 1992 p. 336 and p. 338. See also Chapters 4.2.9 and 5. 
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for genes which characterises an animal grouping.235 Furthermore, it can be argued that, 
in respect for the main rule, the demand for a narrow interpretation of the exception may 
lead to patentability for these particular genes.236 To conclude, it can be said that based 
on the sources of law presented here, the legal situation for animal genes in this respect 
is more uncertain than for plants. Nevertheless, the most probable conclusion is that an 
animal grouping characterised by particular genes holding traits which makes the patent 
claim comprise one or more animal varieties is patentable.  
 
4.3.5 Conclusion  
 
The discussions above have shown that, though on partly divergent grounds, both plant 
and animal individual specimens and plant and animal microbiological material are not 
excluded from patentability due to the variety exception under both EPC and the 
Directive. This may imply that the variety exception in EPC and the Directive, on this 
point of law, does not reflect a wide rule. Thus, this opens for a wide access to patent 
categories of plants and animals. 
                                                     
235 See the discussion above. 
236 T 19/90 point 4.5 of the Reasons. 
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5 UPOV-91’s impact on the interpretation of EPC and the Directive 
5.1 Introduction –plant varieties  
 
As pointed out above, there is an international system for the protection of plant 
varieties. In this Chapter, the main question is how the cessation of the dual protection 
ban in UPOV affects the plant and animal variety exception in EPC and the Directive. 
before going into that issue it is necessary to discuss whether UPOV can be used as a 
source of law in the understanding of EPC and the Directive. In this chapter and 
Chapters 5.4 to 5.6 the focus is directed at plant varieties, while Chapter 5.7 discusses 
UPOV-91’s impact on the term animal variety as applied in EPC and the Directive. 
Animal varieties are assessed in a separate chapter because such subject matter cannot 
be protected by the UPOV Convention.  
 
5.2 UPOV-91 as a source of law when interpreting EPC 
 
The question is if UPOV-91 can be used as a source of law in the interpretation of plant 
variety in EPC. Basically, the assessment of UPOV’s possible influence on EPC is 
founded in the balancing of the interests of sovereignty of state on the one hand and on 
the other hand effectiveness and dynamics qualities of treaties. In this context, 
sovereignty of state implicates that a state shall only be bound by obligations it has 
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explicitly taken on through the ratification of a treaty or through state practice.237 The 
principle of effective interpretation means that a treaty should not be left meaningless or 
ineffective relative to the object and purpose of the treaty following an interpretation.238 
In this relation dynamic interpretation means that a treaty is understood in accordance 
with evolvement towards a particular objective. Typically, this kind of interpretation 
leads to results which go beyond the ordinary and contextual meaning of the provision 
at hand, but which is in line with the object and purpose of the treaty. In other words, 
dynamic interpretation and the principle of effectiveness are based on a teleological 
view of approaching legal questions. The principle of sovereignty of state, on the other 
hand, typically favours a narrow interpretation also in relation to the use of other treaties 
in the interpretation.239 In relation to the understanding of plant varieties, the principle 
of sovereignty of state promotes an interpretation based on sources which can be 
deduced from what has been agreed between the members of EPO.  Dynamic 
interpretation and the principle of effective interpretation, on the other hand, encourage 
application of the UPOV Convention in the interpretation of EPC. 
 
The point of departure in public international law is that a state is only bound by 
obligations it has undertaken or custom not actively opposed through state practice.240 
As mentioned in the previous paragraph this displays one side of state sovereignty and 
is expressed in Article 34 of the Vienna Convention where it is stated that: 
 
                                                     
237 Bernhardt 1995 p. 900 and Ballreich 1995 p. 945. 
238 Oppenheim 1992 p. 1280. 
239 Bernhardt 1995 II p. 1419 and Oppenheim 1992 p. 1274 on the rule of in dubio mitius. 
240 Bernhardt 1995 p. 900 and Ballreich 1995 p. 945. 
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‘A treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its 
concent.’241 
 
Applying the UPOV-91 understanding of plant variety in the interpretation of the term 
plant variety EPC may create obligations which cannot be derived from the treaties 
themselves. This entails that as a point of departure an understanding of a term in one 
treaty cannot be applied in the interpretation of a similar term in another treaty.  
 
The next question is if there are exceptions to this point of departure. In Article 31, 
paragraph 3, litra c of the Vienna Convention it is stated that:  
 
‘There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 
any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the  
 parties.’242 
 
There are two cumulative criteria that have to be met in order to apply the 
understanding of a term to the interpretation of a similar term in another treaty. First, the 
rule (term) which is to be applied has to be a ‘relevant rule[…]  of international law’ to 
the treaty at hand. Second, the two treaties have to be applicable ‘between the parties’.  
 
‘A rule of international law’ can in this respect be understood as an obligation or a right 
taken on through agreement or state practice. This rule also has to be ‘relevant’ to the 
term being interpreted. One approach is to take the objectives of the treaties into 
consideration. A basic principle is that a convention shall be interpreted along the lines 
                                                     
241 Article 34 of the Vienna Convention.  
242 Article 31, paragraph 3, litra c of the Vienna Convention. 
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of its object and purpose.243 The objectives of a treaty may influence the interpretation 
of its provisions. For instance, the wording in two treaties may be identical even though 
the background for and objectives to the creation of the agreements is different. This 
kind of differences may constitute a basis for a diverging interpretation result. When 
applying this principle to Article 31, paragraph 3, litra c a comparison of the treaties’ 
objectives can give an indication of the source treaty’s suitability as a source of law. 
The more similar the objectives are, the more suitable the treaty is.  Consequently, a 
treaty’s relevance may depend on its objective compared to the object and purpose of 
the treaty at hand. As discussed in Chapter 4.2.9, the object and purpose of the UPOV-
91 and EPC are closely related since the variety exception in the latter is established to 
create a division of protectable subject matter between the two systems of protection. 
Furthermore, the definition of plant variety in Rule 23b (4) EPC Implementing 
Regulaitons is in substance identical to the definition in Article 1 (vi) UPOV-91.244 This 
indicates that the term plant variety in UPOV-91 is a ‘relevant rule of international law’ 
in relation to the interpretation of plant variety in EPC. 
 
The next question is how the second criterion, applicable ‘between the parties’, is 
understood in public international law. It can have at least two meanings. On the one 
hand, it may indicate that only the two parties involved in a particular dispute have to be 
parties of the two treaties. On the other hand, it can be understood as to mean that the 
treaty being used as a source must be signed by all of the states that are part of the treaty 
being interpreted. The first interpretation is particularly practical when two bilateral 
treaties, between the same two states, are at hand. However, many treaties are 
multilateral. This lowers the probability of two treaties having identical set of parties. 
                                                     
243 See Article 31, paragraph 1of the Vienna Convention. 
244 See G 1/98 point 3.1 of the Reasons.  
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The wording can be said to open for both alternatives. Thus, according to the ordinary 
meaning of the wording the provision appears to be unclear on this point of law.245  
 
As mentioned above, state sovereignty and effectiveness are key objectives in the public 
international law. It can be argued that interpreting a term in one convention applying 
the understanding of a similar term in another treaty may lead to effective results even 
though the contracting parties are not identical. The principle of state sovereignty 
suggests that states only are bound by rights and obligations they have agreed to and 
that all parties therefore have to be identical. The reason for this is that the interpretation 
will create a special understanding of the obligation. This interpretation of the term will 
have to be taken into account by all parties to the treaty at hand when interpreting the 
treaty on a later occasion. This effect holds a particular significance when the treaty at 
hand is interpreted by an authoritative institution, such as the EPO Boards of Appeal 
(Technical or Enlarged), which argumentation and result is often followed by these 
institutions later and therefore also by subordinate instances.246 They will therefore be 
committed to an interpretation of the provision which they have not accepted as binding 
to them.  Hence, to interpret a term in one treaty based on the interpretation of a similar 
term in another treaty with a different set of parties is therefore problematic in relation 
to basic principals of international law. Consequently, it is not sufficient that the two 
parties involved in the conflict are the same. Furthermore, the EPO Legal Board of 
Appeal emphasises that all members of both treaties have to be identical in order to 
apply Article 31, third paragraph of the Vienna Convention.247 This case was related to 
                                                     
245 Palmeter and Mavroidis seems to be of the opinion that ‘parties’ refers to the parties of the 
particular dispute. See Palmeter and Mavroidis 1998 p. 411.  
246 See Paterson 1992 p. 8. 
247 The united cases AstraZeneca/Priority from India J9/98 and J10/98 point 4.2 of the Reasons.  
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the application of the Patent Co-operation Treaty priority rights based on the TRIPs 
Agreements impact on the interpretation of EPC. The situation here and in the present 
case is therefore not identical. Moreover, this understanding of Article 31, third 
paragraph of the Vienna Convention is not completely clarified since the Legal Board of 
Appeal referred the question of interpretation and direct effect of TRIPs in EPC to the 
Enlarged Board of Appeal.248 They are yet to answer the question posed to them. 
However, the case gives an indication on how EPO sees this point of law. The 
Technical Board of Appeal stated that in order to apply Article 31, third paragraph, litra 
c the parties of the treaties at hand had to be identical.249 Thus, the requirement 
applicable ‘between the parties’ entails that all parities have to be identical.  
 
The question is therefore if the parties of EPO are all parties to the UPOV-91 
Convention. 14 of 27 EPC members are not parties to UPOV-91. This shows that the 
requirement of identify is not fulfilled and that, on the basis of Article 31, paragraph 3, 
litra c, the UPOV-91 understanding of plant variety cannot, according to Article 31, 
third paragraph, litra c, be applied to the interpretation of plant variety in EPC. Even 
though UPOV-91, according to customary international law codified in the Vienna 
Convention, is not a source of law in this situation EPO seems to take the relationship 
with UPOV-91 into consideration. Thus, the thesis discusses how the relation between 
UPOV-91 and EPC is viewed by EPO in Chapter 5.5.  
 
                                                     
248 J9/98 and J10/98 point 2 of the Order. The case is pending under reference Nos. G 2/02 and G 
3/02. 
249 J9/98 and J10/98 point 4.2 of the Reasons. 
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5.3 UPOV-91 as a source of law when interpreting the EC Patent Directive 
 
The European Community is not as such party to the UPOV-91 Convention.250 
International obligations only become a part of EC law when the Community as such 
has taken on the obligations. 251  UPOV-91 is therefore not an integral part of EC law. 
However, the European Court of Justice sometimes takes international law into account 
as an auxiliary source of law when interpreting EC law.252 In Chapter 4.2.13 it was 
argued that due to the close relation between EPC and the Directive and since all EC 
members are parties to EPC, EPC could be applied in the interpretation of the Directive. 
The plant variety exception in the Directive is based on the relation between patent law 
and plant breeder’s rights.253 This indicates that there is a strong relationship between 
the Directive and UPOV-91. However, 9 of 15 EC members are not parties to UPOV-
91. This indicates that UPOV-91 cannot be used as a means of interpretation of the EC 
Patent Directive. Based on these arguments it is difficult to determine UPOV-91’s status 
as a source of law in relation to the Directive. However, since 9 of the EC member 
states are not parties to UPOV-91, the most probable conclusion is that UPOV-91 
cannot be used as a source of law when interpreting the Directive. Just as for EPC it 
seems that the European Community takes into account the relationship between the 
Directive and UPOV-91 even though the latter is not seen as a source of law in EC law. 
                                                     
250 See www.upov.org/en/about/members/pdf/members.pdf. Accessed on 10 November 2003.  
251 Bourgeois 2000 p. 92. 
252 See for example C-10/61 Commission v. Italy, (1962) ECR 1. See also Kapteyn and Themaat 
1998 p. 280.  
253 See Article 2, third paragraph of the Directive cf. Recital 27 of the preamble of the EC Plant 
Variety Rights Regulation.  
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This relationship is assessed in Chapter 5.5. Before addressing that issue it is necessary 
to assess the background for the relationship. This is done in the following chapter. 
 
5.4 The dual protection ban 
 
The dual protection ban, also referred to as the double protection ban, prohibits the 
protection of subject matter which falls within the definition of plant variety as applied 
in UPOV in other intellectual property protection systems. In Article 2 of UPOV-61 and 
UPOV-78 it is stated that: 
 
‘Each member State of the Union may recognise the right of the breeder provided for in 
this Convention by the grant either of a special title of protection or of a patent.  
Nevertheless, a member State of the Union whose national law admits of protection 
under both these forms may provide only one of them for one and the same botanical 
genus or species.’254  
 
This means that identical subject matter cannot be protected both by patent and by plant 
breeder’s rights without breaking with the obligations of UPOV-61 and UPOV-78. This 
was taken into account when the predecessor of EPC, the Strasbourg Patent Convention, 
was formed, and continued in EPC and the Directive by excepting plant varieties from 
patentability.  The ban was, however, not pursued in the 1991 version of the UPOV 
Convention. This was done because the majority of the contracting states of UPOV-91 
did not wish to attempt to give rules on forms of protection other than plant breeder’s 
                                                     
254 Article 2 (1) of UPOV-61 and  -78. 
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rights.255 Moreover, the parties were of the opinion that the question of deciding 
intellectual property protection for plant varieties was best left in the hands of the 
national legislatures.256 In addition, it was emphasised that several of the contracting 
parties had national legislature opening for patenting of plant varieties. These states 
would therefore have problems complying with the dual protection ban.257 Adjustments 
had been done earlier when revising the Convention in 1978. The United States 
practiced double protection. To satisfy the US, the double protection ban was softened 
by the new Article 37 (1) which stated that parallel protection is acceptable if 
notification is given to the Secretary-General when signing or ratifying.258 This 
amendment was seen as insufficient by the states which opted for patenting of plant 
varieties when revising the Convention in 1991. It was also pointed out that the dual 
protection ban could keep potential future member states from taking on the obligations 
of the Convention.259 The double protection ban was therefore not taken into the UPOV-
91 Convention. If the understanding of plant variety in the patent systems, EPC, and the 
Directive, and UPOV-91 are identical and identical subject matter cannot be protected 
by both systems, the dual protection ban will imply that the interpretation of the term 
will affect what subject matter can be protected by each system. A wide interpretation 
of plant variety will mean that fewer categories of plants can be patented due to the 
                                                     
255 See the Minutes of the Records of the Diplomatic Conference for the Revision of the 
International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, points 251.1, 256.2 and 
259. 
256 Ibid., points 254.1, 257.1, 260 and 261. 
257 Ibid., point 254.2. 
258 Marin 2002 p. 33. 
259 See the Minutes of the Records of the Diplomatic Conference for the Revision of the 
International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, point 254.1. 
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variety exception, while more subject matter may be protectable under the UPOV 
Convention –and vice versa. In the next chapter the discussion centres on whether the 
understanding of plant variety is identical in the patent systems and the UPOV 
Convention. Chapter 5.6 and 5.7 assesses the consequences of not continuing the dual 
protection ban in UPOV-91. 
 
5.5 Discussion of identical interpretation –plant varieties  
 
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the main question is how the cessation 
of the dual protection ban in UPOV affects the variety exception in EPC and the 
Directive. Before this can be discussed, one additional topic mus be addressed: Namely 
if the interpretation of plant variety in EPC and the Directive are identical to the 
understanding of the term in UPOV-91.  
 
The Implementing Regulations to the EPC Convention,260 Rule 23b (4) defines the term 
plant variety in EPC. The wording is identical to the wording in UPOV-91. This is also 
emphasised in the EPO Official Journal, the definition’s relation to other legal 
documents is commented on and explained: 
 
‘The definition follows the wording of the concept of variety as set forth in Article 1 
(vi) of the 1991 UPOV Convention.’261 
 
                                                     
260 The provisions concerning biotechnological inventions in these regulations entered into force 
on 1 September 1999. 
261 OJ EPO 8-9/1999, p. 579, point 18. 
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The quotation suggests that the term is to be understood identically in both EPC and 
UPOV-91. This is supported by another sentence in the same Official Journal:  
 
‘The EPO boards of appeal have hitherto always used the UPOV Convention`s concept 
of variety as the basis for implementing Article 53 (b) EPC (see T 49/83, T 320/87 and 
most recently T 356/93).’ 262 
 
Here, it is stated that, based on practice from the Technical Boards of Appeal, the term 
plant variety is to be interpreted identical to the understanding of the term in UPOV-91. 
In T 49/83, one of the cases referred to in the quotation above, the Technical Board of 
Appeal furthers the application: 
 
‘This definition is reflected in the International Convention for the Protection of New 
Varieties of Plants of 2 December 1961,…’263 
 
This indicates that the Technical Board of Appeal also sees the definition in the 1961 
UPOV Convention to be consistent with the one in EPC. In T 320/87, the Lubrizol case, 
this argumentation is repeated.264 In relation to the UPOV-91 Convention, the Technical 
Board of Appeal in the Plant Genetic Systems case refers to the definition of plant 
variety in UPOV-91 when defining the term in EPC.265 This implies that the 
understanding of the term in EPC is to be interpreted identically to the interpretation in 
                                                     
262 Ibid.. 
263 T 49/83 point 2 of the Reasons.  
264 T 320/87 point 13 of the Reasons. 
265 T 356/93 point 23 of the Reasons. 
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UPOV-91. The quotations above give the impression that that the term plant variety in 
EPC and UPOV is to be interpreted identically.  
 
In the previous paragraph the centre of attention has been EPC. In the following, the 
focus changes to cover the discussion from the perspective of the European Community. 
The question is if the definitions of plant variety in the Directive and UPOV-91 are 
interpreted identically. Plant variety is defined in the Community Plant Variety Rights 
Regulation.266 The wording of the definition is identical to the definition presented in 
UPOV-91. The Regulation is relevant because the Directive refers to it for the definition 
of plant variety. 267 This indicates that the definitions are to be interpreted identically. 
The relationship to other intellectual property protection systems is discussed in the 
preamble of the Regulation: 
 
‘…Whereas this definition is not intended to alter definitions which may have been 
established in the field of intellectual property rights….’268 
 
Applied to the question here, the quotation can mean that the legislature of the European 
Community does not intend to alter the interface between patent protection and plant 
variety protection. This indicates that the definition in the Community Plant Variety 
Rights Regulation, and consequently also in the Directive, and UPOV-91 are identical. 
The statement presented here may be seen as a result of the underlying principle of 
                                                     
266 EC Regulation NO2100/94. 
267 Article 2, third paragraph of the Patent Directive. 
268 Recital 9 of the preamble of EC Regulation NO2100/94. 
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harmonisation of EC members’ legislation .269 This objective is also emphasized in the 
following citation from the same preamble: 
 
‘…Whereas it is however highly desirable to have a common definition in both fields; 
whereas therefore appropriate efforts at international level should be supported to reach 
such a common definition;…’270 
 
Even though the principle of harmonisation is put forth here, the perspective is different. 
The text can be interpreted as an indication that there currently is no common 
understanding of the term plant variety in the Directive and UPOV-91. Harmonisation 
is wanted, but not yet achieved. Seemingly, there is a conflict between the two quoted 
excerpts. The first indicates identity between the Directive and UPOV-91, while the 
second does the opposite. In my opinion, the first quotation is clearer and more 
unambiguous than the latter. This speaks in favour of looking at the understanding of 
the definitions as identical. 
 
Another approach is to ask what the legislature means when it wants to achieve a 
‘common definition’. 271 The EC law is not statically connected to the legal situation 
today. New legislation as well as new interpretations of existing legislation can 
contribute to this dynamics. 272 There may be developments changing the balance 
between the different protection systems. For instance, case law may result in a change 
in how plant variety is understood. It can be argued that the meaning of identical terms 
                                                     
269 Recital 5 of the preamble of the Rome treaty. 
270 Recital 10 of the preamble of EC Regulation NO2100/94. 
271 Ibid. 
272 Kapteyn and Themaat 1998 p.115 and p. 289. 
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can, within certain frames, be dynamical in relation to the others. Consequently, there is 
not one common definition, only definitions evolving together. In harmony with this, 
the conclusion is that the interpretations of plant variety in the Directive and UPOV-91 
are identical today. 
     
The conclusion, based on the discussions above, is that the definitions of plant variety in 
EPC, the Directive and UPOV-91 are to be interpreted identically as well as having an 
identical wording. This feature is taken into consideration when identifying the 
consequences of the cessation of the dual protection ban. 
 
5.6 Consequences of the cessation of the dual protection ban –plant varieties  
 
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the main question in this chapter is 
what consequences may occur in the cessation of the dual protection ban in UPOV-91. 
In other words the question is whether the cessation starts a process which results in that 
the variety exception changes or no longer applies. To illustrate, two extreme scenarios 
are presented. The first is that plant varieties can be patented under the EPO and EC 
patent regimes because they no longer have to take into account what is to be protected 
under the UPOV regime. The second is that EPC and the Directive are to be interpreted 
as before because they are not affected by the cessation of the dual protection ban. In 
the following presentation the reasoning for these two alternatives is discussed. 
 
It can be said that the grounds for exempting plant varieties from patentability under 
EPC and the Directive begin to fade when the dual protection ban in UPOV-91 is 
removed. As presented above, the reason for exempting plant varieties from 
patentability was that a system for protecting such subject matter already existed and 
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that there was a ban against double protection.273 When the dual protection ban is taken 
away, the explanation is no longer valid and there is less need to except plant variety as 
understood in the UPOV Convention from patentability.274 This indicates that the 
understanding of plant variety in EPC and the Directive may be affected by the 
cessation of the dual protection ban.  
 
However, it can be argued that the contracting parties of the Strasbourg Patent 
Convention, the predecessor of EPC, chose to exempt plant varieties due to the 
possibility of protecting such subject matter through a sui generis system regardless of 
the dual protection ban.275 The contracting parties may have considered the UPOV 
system better suited for protecting plant varieties than the patent system and thus 
exempting such subject matter from patentability. In the continuation of this 
argumentation it should be noted that the dual protection ban was problematic for states 
which opted for patent or other protection other than UPOV protection for plant 
varieties. Australia, for example, opposed the dual protection ban because it meant that 
their legislation was in conflict with their obligations taken on through the UPOV 
Convention.276 For the parties to the EPC and members of the EU, which excluded plant 
varieties from patentability, there was no problem of that kind. These arguments can 
indicate that removal of the dual protection ban does not affect the interpretation of 
plant variety in EPC and the Directive.  
 
                                                     
273 See Chapter 4.2.9. 
274 Westerlund seems to take this stand. See Westerlund 2001 p. 446. 
275 Paterson 1992 p. 336. 
276 See the Minutes of the Records of the Diplomatic Conference for the Revision of the 
International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, point 254.1. 
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Furthermore, several of the members of the EC are not parties to the UPOV-91 
Convention. Austria, Belgium, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy and Portugal have ratified 
older versions of the UPOV Convention. Greece and Luxembourg are not parties to any 
UPOV version. These states are also parties to the EPC. In addition to these there are 
also some EPC states which are not members of the EC, that are parties to older 
versions of the UOPV Convention (Switzerland and Slovakia) and some that are not 
party to any UPOV Convention (Cyprus, Liechtenstein and Monaco). This means that if 
a change in the UPOV Convention where to affect the interpretation of plant variety in 
EPC and the Directive, states which are obligated to ban double protection and states 
which have no relation to UPOV will have to take on responsibilities they have not 
wanted. Both these consequences are problematic with regards to the principle of 
sovereignty of state.277 The states that are parties of older versions of UPOV will de 
facto be forced to relate to the provisions they have objected to through the new 
interpretations in the patent regimes. The states that are not part of any UPOV 
Convention should not have their obligations in the patent systems affected by treaties 
to which they have no relation. This indicates that the changes in UPOV-91 do not 
affect the understanding of plant variety in EPC and the Directive.  
 
The current interpretation of the term plant variety, not encompassing categories of 
plants of superordinate taxonomical rank as well as subordinate biological levels, makes 
the variety exception for plants relatively narrow.278 Today it is possible for inventors to 
apply for plant variety protection on the variety level and patent protection on 
superordinate taxonomical levels such as the family level or having subordinate 
                                                     
277 See Chapter 5.2. 
278 Bently and Sherman 2001 p. 550. 
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biological levels, e.g. the gene level, as the scope of the patent claim.279 If this trend is 
continued it may lead to an erosion of the variety exception even though plant variety is 
to be interpreted identically in both UPOV and the two patent systems because the 
systems may overlap to a greater extent now that the dual protection ban is taken out of 
the UPOV Convention. 280 This argument indicates that the cessation of the dual 
protection ban may affect the interpretation of plant variety in EPC and the Directive. 
 
In the continuation of this argument, Bently and Sherman states that due to the cessation 
of the dual protection ban, the patent systems and the UPOV system are no longer 
mutually exclusive and that this may lead to overlap between the systems. 281 However, 
it may very well be that the patent systems and the plant variety protection system are 
mutually exclusive even though the dual protection ban was not continued in UPOV-91. 
Plant varieties are protected by UPOV.282 Plant varieties are exempted as patentable 
subject matter from EPC and the Directive.283 Due to the reasons for the exception of 
plant varieties EPO and EC have, at least up until today, built their interpretation of 
plant variety on the UPOV understanding/definition.284 Based on this argumentation, the 
two systems are mutually exclusive. Hence, this indicates that the cessation of the dual 
protection does not affect the interpretation of plant variety under EPC and the 
Directive.  
 
                                                     
279 See Chapter 4. 
280 Bently and Sherman 2001 p. 550.  
281 Ibid.. 
282 Article 2 UPOV-91.  
283 See Article 53 (b) EPC and Article 4, first paragraph, litra a of the Directive. 
284 See for example T 49/83 point 4 of the Reasons. 
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Having said this, it must be noted that since one of the reasons for excepting plant 
varieties from patentability was that dual protection was forbidden by the earlier 
versions of the UPOV Convention, and this reason is fading because of UPOV-91, it is 
possible that the interpretation of plant variety in EPC and the Directive may be 
different in the future. This possibility can result in the two systems no longer being 
mutually exclusive and indicates that the cessation of the dual protection ban may affect 
the understanding of plant variety under EPC and the Directive. 
 
The discussion above gives numerous arguments in the discussion of the dual protection 
ban’s possible impact on the interpretation of plant variety under EPC and the Directive. 
Nevertheless, a clear conclusion is difficult to deduce from the examination. However, 
some considerations that are important to the assessment may be indicated. The answer 
may lie in the balancing of two important considerations. First, the interface between 
the patent systems and the plant breeder’s rights system depends on what division of 
labour the contracting parties to UPOV and EPC and the members of the EC choose to 
apply. Second, the interface may be determined by how much emphasis is put on the 
sovereignty of the contracting states.   
 
5.7 Consequences for the interpretation of animal varieties  
 
In the previous chapter the consequences of the dual protection ban’s cessation for the 
term plant variety as understood in EPC and the Directive was discussed. In this chapter 
the discussion focuses on how the dual protection ban’s cessation may affect the 
understanding of the term animal variety. 
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At first glance, the cessation of the dual protection ban seems not to affect the 
interpretation of animal variety in EPC and the Directive because the UPOV 
Convention concerns the protection of plant varieties not animal varieties. If the 
understanding of plant variety in EPC and the Directive is not affected by the cessation 
of the dual protection ban in UPOV-91, there is no reason for the interpretation of 
animal variety to be affected. However, if the change in the UPOV Convention affects 
the understanding of plant variety in EPC and the Directive in the sense that the term is 
interpreted more narrowly or perhaps plant varieties are no longer excluded from 
patentability at all, this may have consequences for the interpretation of animal variety 
in EPC and the directive. From a teleological point of view, the interpretation of animal 
variety has to be related to the intention of the variety exception. Bearing in mind that 
the variety exception was created due to the patent systems’ relationship to plant 
breeder’s rights protection, it can be argued that a more comprehensive exclusion of 
animal subject matter than plant subject matter would not be in accordance with a 
teleological interpretation of the variety exception. The contextual aspect requires the 
interpretation of animal variety to be seen in connection with the variety exception as a 
whole. This means that the interpretation of the term plant variety has to be taken into 
account when understanding animal variety. In principle, the two terms may very well 
be interpreted differently. Taking into consideration, however, the close connection 
between the terms and the relation to the reason for excepting plant and animal 
varieties, it can be said that animal variety should not be interpreted at least not more 
extensively than plant variety. Consequently, if the interpretation of the term plant 
variety is affected by the cessation of the UPOV dual protection ban, it can be argued 
that the understanding of animal variety should be affected accordingly.  
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6  The TRIPs Agreement’s impact on the interpretation of EPC and the 
Directive 
 
The question to be examined here is how the understanding of the term plant varieties 
in Article 27 (3) (b) TRIPs affects the understanding of plant variety in EPC and the EC 
Directive. Before assessing the consequences of using TRIPs as a source of law, the 
relevance of the Agreement as a means of interpretation for EPC and the Directive has 
to be examined. Thereinafter, the TRIPs understanding of the term is discussed before 
assessing the consequences for the interpretation of plant variety in EPC and the 
Directive.  
 
6.1 TRIPs as a means of interpretation for EPC 
 
The question in this chapter is whether the plant varieties in Article 27 (3) (b) TRIPs 
can be used in the interpretation of plant variety in EPC. This is not a question of direct 
application of TRIPs, which according to EPO case law EPC does not open for.285 The 
question is merely whether TRIPs can be taken into consideration when interpreting 
EPC. The point of departure is that a state is only obligated by the obligations it has 
taken on.286 This means that the main rule of international law is that one treaty does not 
create obligation when interpreting another treaty. In Article 31, third paragraph, litra c 
an exception to this starting point is presented. It emphasises that a treaty can be 
interpreted in the light of another treaty when the interpretation aid is a ‘relevant rule of 
                                                     
285 International Business Machines Corporation/Asynchronous resynchronization of a commit 
procedure, T 1173/97 point 2.2 of the Reasons. 
286 Article 34 of the Vienna Convention.  
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international law’ which is applicable ‘between the parties’. The TRIPs Agreement is 
taken into consideration when interpreting EPC in T 1173/97.287 The Technical Board of 
Appeal emphasised that TRIPs did not have direct affect, but was taken into 
consideration since it is aimed at setting common standards for patent rights.288 This 
argumentation has later been repeated in the joined cases J 9/98 and J 10/98.289 
Furthermore, the terms plant variety and plant varieties in EPC and TRIPs are similar, 
both on the field of intellectual property rights. Thus, the plant varieties in Article 27 
(3) (b) TRIPs is ‘a relevant rule of international law’ in relation to the understanding of 
plant variety in EPC. All parties to EPC are also WTO members.290 This entails that the 
term plant varieties in Article 27 (3) (b) TRIPs is applicable ‘between the parties’. 
Consequently, EPC is interpreted in the light of TRIPs on this point of law.  
 
6.2 TRIPs as an interpretation aid when interpreting the EC Patent Directive 
 
The question here is whether the term plant varieties in Article 27 (3) (b) TRIPs can 
have an influence on the understanding of plant variety in the EC Patent Directive. The 
question of direct effect of the TRIPs Agreement in EC law is not discussed since it is 
not necessary for the assessment in this thesis.291 The European Community as such is a 
                                                     
287 T 1173/97 point 2.3 of the Reasons. 
288 Ibid..  
289 AstraZeneca/Priority from India, J 9/98 and J 10/98 point 5.1 of the Reasons.  
290 See www.epo.org/epo/members.htm cf. 
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm. Accessed on 10 November 2003.  
291 EC law does not, as a point of departure, open for direct effect of WTO law. See Snyder 2003 
p. 326.  
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member of WTO.292 The point of departure in EC law is that international agreements 
concluded by EC are integral parts of EC law.293 This means that they can be used in the 
interpretation of EC law. The question is whether this also is the case for WTO law. 
WTO law has served as a model for the anti-dumping legislation in EC.294 WTO law is 
therefore used as an aid for interpreting EC secondary legislation on this field.295 On the 
field of intellectual property rights, however, EC legislation has not been affected by 
WTO law to that extent.296 Nevertheless, Advocate General Jacobs used TRIPs as an 
interpretation aid in the Silhouette case and the Procter & Gamble case.297 The European 
Court of Justice did not refer to TRIPs, but came to the same result on the merits. This 
can indicate that the European Court of Justice is reluctant to interpret EC secondary 
legislation on the field of intellectual property rights in the light of the TRIPs 
Agreement. However, it can also mean that they agreed with Advocate General Jacobs 
in principle, but not need to address the issue due to the merits of the cases. On this 
background, the understanding of plant variety in the EC Patent Directive is interpreted 
in the light of plant varieties in Article 27 (3) (b) TRIPs. 
                                                     
292 See www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm. Accessed on 10 November 
2003.  
293 C-181/73, Haegeman, (1974) ECR 449 and Racke, ECR I-3655. See also Bourgeois 2000 p. 
92 with further references and Kapteyn and Themaat 1998 p. 278.  
294 Snyder 2003 p. 320. 
295 See for example joined Cases T-33 & 34/98, Petrotub SA and Republica SA v. Council, 
(1999) ECR II-3837. See also Snyder 2003 p. 321.  
296 Snyder 2003 p. 322. 
297 C-355/96, Silhouette International Schmied GmbH & Co KG v. Hartlauer 
Handeslsgesellschaft mbH, (1998) ECR I-4799 and C 383/99, Procter & Gamble v. Office for 
Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs), (2001) ECR I-6251. 
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6.3 The interpretation of Article 27 (3) (b) TRIPs –Plant variety  
 
The question to be discussed here is, as suggested in the previous paragraph, how the 
term plant varieties in Article 27 (3) (b) TRIPs is to be understood.  
 
In the last sentence of Article 27 (3) (b) it is stated that the provision is to be reviewed 
four years after the entry into force of the WTO Agreement.298 The WTO Agreement 
entered into force in 1995. This entails that the provision was opened for review in 
1999. The review is yet to be concluded. An assessment of the possible outcome and 
consequences of the review would lead non-legal discussions which cannot be 
investigated by means of legal methodology and thus beyond the scope of this thesis. 
The review is therefore not further discussed.  
 
6.3.1 Wording  
 
The second part of Article 27 (3) (b) concerns the protection of plant varieties. 
According to the wording of the provision, plant varieties have to be protected 
efficiently by patent law, a sui generis system or a combination of the two. A further 
explanation of the term plant variety is not given in TRIPs. A clear understanding of the 
term is therefore not evident from assessment of the wording of the provision and a 
contextual interpretation in relation to other parts of the agreement.  
 
                                                     
298 Article 27 (3) (b) TRIPs. 
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6.3.2 Influence from the UPOV-91 Convention 
 
Placing the provision in a broader context, it may be possible to assess plant variety in 
relation to existing definitions and understandings of the term in other intellectual 
property right regimes. This opens for two questions. First, if one specific external 
definition from another treaty may be applied in the understanding of plant varieties in 
TRIPs on the basis of an interpretation of TRIPs. Second, if an external understanding is 
to be applied on the basis of customary law. Thus, though related, this is not a question 
of if there are one or more ‘effective’ sui generis systems for the protection of plant 
varieties, but rather a question of how the term plant variety in TRIPs is to be 
understood. 299  
 
In the following it is assessed whether the UPOV-91 understanding of plant variety may 
be used in the interpretation of the term plant varieties in the TRIPs Agreement.300 
Thus, this is related to the first question namely if another treaty can be used in the 
interpretation of TRIPs. It is not given that UPOV is the only system of plant variety 
protection which is ‘effective’ according to the TRIPs Agreement, and thus in a position 
where it may have an impact, but since UPOV is the worlds leading sui generis system 
for protection of plant varieties its potential impact on the understanding of plant 
variety in TRIPs is discussed.301  
 
As seen in Chapter 5.2, the principle of sovereignty of state is mirrored in the Vienna 
Convention. According to Article 34 of the Vienna Convention a treaty cannot create 
                                                     
299 Article 27 (3) (b) TRIPs. 
300 Cf. the first question. 
301 Matthews 2002 p. 59 and Correa 1998 p. 197. 
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neither obligations nor rights for states which are not party to the treaty at hand. 302 
Since the TRIPs Agreement and UPOV-91 are independent treaties not directly related 
to each other this indicates that, as a point of departure, the understanding of plant 
variety in the UPOV-91 Convention cannot be applied to the interpretation of plant 
varieties in the TRIPs Agreement. The subsequent question is if the exception to this 
starting point is applicable.  
 
In Article 31, third paragraph, litra c it is stated that: 
 
‘There shall be taken into account, together with the context…any relevant rules of 
international law applicable in the relation between the parties.’ 303 
 
In relation to Article 31, third paragraph, litra c of the Vienna Convention, the question 
is if the requirement which demands that the rule has to be a ‘relevant rule of 
international law’ in relation to the TRIPs Agreement. Some of the states which are not 
members of UPOV oppose to the UPOV understanding of plant variety. Correa, for 
example, suggests that that not only plant breeder’s rights, but also farmers rights to the 
less industrialised farmers varieties should be included in the term plant varieties in the 
TRIPs Agreement.304 Such interpretation is not consistent with the UPOV understanding 
of the terms.305 Moreover, EPC and the EC Patent Directive delimits their protection 
towards plant varieties as defined in UPOV-91.306 This is related to the strong 
                                                     
302 Article 34 of the Vienna Convention.  
303 Article 31, third paragraph, litra c of the Vienna Convention.  
304 Correa 1998 p. 197. 
305 Article 1 (vi) of the UPOV-91 Convention.  
306 See Chapter 4.2. 
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teleological connection between EPO and EC patent protection and plant breeder’s 
rights protected through the UPOV Convention.307 Members of WTO on the other hand 
are, through the TRIPs Agreement, obligated to afford adequate intellectual property 
protection for plant varieties.308 Thus, TRIPs does not relate to the UPOV Convention 
to the same extent as EPC and the Directive. This indicates that the UPOV-91 
understanding of plant variety is not ‘a relevant rule of international law’ in relation to 
the interpretation of plant varieties in TRIPs. 
 
The next question is whether the criterion applicable ‘between the parties’ is fulfilled. 
23 of the WTO members are also parties to the UPOV-91 Convention. In these states’ 
plant variety legislation plant variety holds the UPOV meaning.309 122 other WTO 
members are not parties to the UPOV-91 Convention.310 These have objected to the 
legal content of the 1991 version of UPOV and have therefore not ratified the 
convention. An understanding of plant varieties in accordance with the UPOV-91 
definition would entail that states not parties to UPOV-91 are, through TRIPs, tied to 
the very definition they rejected. Since there are states which are members of the WTO 
but not parties to UPOV-91, the criterion ‘between the parties’ is not fulfilled.  
 
To conclude, the discussion above indicates that according to Article 34 and 31, third 
paragraph, litra c of the Vienna Convention the UPOV-91 understanding of plant 
variety cannot be used in the interpretation of plant varieties in Article 27 (3) (b) TRIPs. 
                                                     
307 See Chapter 4.2.9. 
308 Article 27 (3) (b) TRIPs.  
309 The numbers based on the latest available membership lists from WTO (14 April 2003) and 
UPOV (31 July 2003). 
310 Ibid.. 
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The circumstances concerning the limited concurrence of contracting states to the 
TRIPs Agreement and the UPOV Convention lead to the second question. Namely, as 
mentioned above, if an external understanding of plant varieties, in particular the 
UPOV-91 definition, is to be applied on the basis of customary law.311 According to 
customary law, codified in Article 38 (1) (b) ICJ, international customary law is created 
on the basis of ‘general practice’ which is ‘accepted as law’.312 This means that the 
practice has to be followed by all states which are to be bound by the custom and that 
they see the practice necessary to fulfil their legal obligations according to public 
international law (opinio juris). Furthermore, Article 38 of the Vienna Convention 
stresses that a rule can become binding to a third party if that state’s practice is in line 
with the rule and it fulfils the requirements customary law. Applied to the situation at 
hand, this suggests that all WTO members have to practice and accept the UPOV-91 
plant variety definition as a legal obligation when interpreting the concept of plant 
varieties under TRIPs. Taking into account that 122 members of the WTO are not 
parties to the 1991 version of UPOV, many of whom have not ratified this version 
partly due to the plant variety definition, it seems that a custom on this point of law is 
non-existing.  
 
Moreover, another feature in WTO law which makes the creation of customary law in 
this matter less plausible is that application of customary law in WTO is rare because 
the system is treaty and not custom based.313 According to the Dispute Settlement Body 
international customary law does not override explicit provisions of the WTO 
                                                     
311 Article 1 (vi) of the UPOV-91 Convention. 
312 Article 38 (1) (b) ICJ. 
313 Palmeter and Mavroidis 1998 p. 407. 
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Agreements.314  Even though there is no direct conflict between the wording of Article 
27 (3) (b) TRIPs and a prospective UPOV-91 based plant variety custom simply 
because the wording does not define plant varieties in TRIPs, the findings of the 
Dispute Settlement Body indicates a reserved  attitude towards use of international 
customary law.  
 
The conclusion is that there is not, on the basis of international customary law, grounds 
for understanding plant varieties in the Article 27 (3) (b) TRIPs to be identical to the 
definition presented in the UPOV-91 Convention. Moreover, an understanding of plant 
varieties based on customary law does not currently exist under WTO law. 
 
6.3.3 The understanding of the term plant in relation to plant variety 
 
Plant is used as a term in the TRIPs Agreement to determine subject matter which 
according to the agreement can be excluded from patentability.315 It is stated that: 
 
 ‘Members may also exclude from patentability:…plants….’316 
 
                                                     
314 EC –Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Complaint by the United 
States, WTO Doc. WT/DS26/R/USA, paragraph 8.157 (August 18, 1997), Complaint by Canada, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS48/R/CAN, paragraph 8.160 (August 18, 1997) and WTO Doc. AB-1997-4, 
WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R paragraph 123 (January 16, 1998). 
315 Article 27 (3) (b) TRIPs. 
316 Ibid.. 
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Hence, according to the wording the members of WTO can choose to not grant patents 
to claims expressing plants. In this relation, the question is if the term plant is different 
from plant variety and thus can provide a contribution to a negative definition of plant 
variety. Plant can be understood as a certain taxonomical category or it can be 
interpreted broader that is to mean plants as such or in other words categories of plants 
on all taxonomical levels. Since the term plant variety, which according to a textual 
interpretation is narrower than plant, is used in the same article, an ordinary 
understanding of the wording and a contextual interpretation suggests the term plant is 
considered to encompass all taxonomical levels. Consequently, this can entail that plant 
variety can be delimited towards other taxonomical categories such as species or 
families. 
 
6.3.4 The demarcation between micro-organism and plant variety 
 
The term micro-organism is used in Article 27 (3) (b) TRIPs. It is stated that: 
 
‘Members may also exclude from patentability:…plant…other than micro-
organisms….’317 
  
This entails that micro-organisms cannot be excluded from patentability. If the 
understanding of the term micro-organism can be determined it can contribute to the 
TRIPs understanding of plant variety. The question is therefore how micro-organism is 
interpreted in the TRIPs Agreement. The term is, however, not defined in the 
agreement. Statements in the revision process of Article 27 (3) (b) supports that view. 
                                                     
317 Article 27 (3) (b) TRIPs. 
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The United States, Japan and Switzerland are for example of the opinion that the 
definition of micro-organism in the Oxford Dictionary is sufficient to distinguish plants 
and animals from micro-organisms.318 According to the dictionary quoted by these 
states a micro-organism is:  
 
 ‘an organism not visible to the naked eye, e.g., bacterium or virus.’319 
 
This may indicate that also plant cells, proteins and genes are encompassed by the term. 
In Contrast, Brazil is in favour of a more scientific understanding.320 Such divergences 
in the interpretation of the bordering term make it difficult to deduce a negative 
definition of plant varieties from the term micro-organism. This suggests that a 
definition of plant varieties cannot be based as definition of the neighbouring term 
micro-organism. 
 
6.3.5 Consequences for the interpretation of plant variety in EPC and the 
Directive  
 
The question here is what impact the understanding of plant varieties in TRIPs has on 
the understanding of plant variety in EPC and the Directive. Based on the available 
                                                     
318 Communication From Switzerland to the TRIPs Council, 15 June 2001, Document 
IP/C/W/284 p. 3. 
319 Communication From Switzerland to the TRIPs Council, 15 June 2001, Document 
IP/C/W/284 p. 3, note 4. 
320 Communication from Brazil to the TRIPs Council, 24 November 2000, Document 
IP/C/W/228 p. 2. 
  119 
 
sources of law, assessed above in Chapters 6.3.1-6.3.4, it is difficult to have a clear 
understanding of the term plant varieties in Article 27 (3) (b) TRIPs. This means that 
EC, which is a member of WTO, is left with a margin of appreciation on this point of 
law. Since the term is ambiguous, the term plant varieties in the TRIPs Agreement has 
little practical effect on the interpretation of plant variety in EPC and the Directive.  
 
7 Implications  
 
In this thesis the legal delimitation of the terms plant variety and animal variety has 
been discussed. The assessments have shown that the understandings of plant variety in 
EPC and the Directive are reflections of the UPOV-91 understanding of the term. And 
thus creates the basis for a division of work between plant breeder’s rights and the 
patent regimes. At the time of conclusion of the variety exception it was not technically 
possible to modify plants or animals in such manner that the result would fulfil the 
patent requirements.321 With the introduction of modern biotechnology, in particular 
gene technology, this situation has changed.322 The thesis shows that plants and animals 
on taxonomical levels superordinate to variety are patentable. This practice of the 
variety exception opens for broad patents on plant and animal subject matter other than 
plant and animal variety.  The exclusive right afforded through the grant of a patent 
shall cover the purpose of the invention.323 If the exclusive right afforded goes beyond 
                                                     
321 Hellstadius 2001 p. 34 and Hellstadius 2002 p. 67.  
322 Westerlund 2001 p. 447. 
323 Bently and Sherman 2001 p. 502.  
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the invention, the patent is too wide. The problem with too broad patents is that they 
may deter other inventors from patenting inventions covered by the patent, but which 
lies beyond the purpose of the patented invention. This situation may result in that some 
products and processes are not invented, hence hindering innovation. With regard to 
plant and animal subject matter with for example one introduced gene, inventing around 
an existing patent is particularly difficult since there rarely are other genes, than the one 
type encompassed by the patent, coding for a particular characteristic. This means that 
broad patents are a particularly comprehensive challenge when dealing with plant and 
animal subject matter. The current interpretation of the variety exception opens for a 
situation where broad, though not necessarily too broad, patents may prosper. Thus, this 
shows the connection between patentability and the scope of the patent claims.324 The 
challenge of limiting the scopes of patents on this field is, due to the current practice of 
the variety exception, left to the European Patent Office and national patent offices. 
This shows that an exception which, due to the technology available at the time of 
conclusion, appeared to be a total prohibition of patenting of plants and animals today 
has evolved making the field of plant and animal subject matter an area where broad 
patents has become a challenge. 
  
                                                     
324 See Chapter 1.1. 
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